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Abstract
Over the last few decades, the role of natural resources to the development of
economies has gained considerable attention. Empirical studies establishing the
link between natural resources and development have largely resorted to aggregated
country level studies with most finding little to no development in developing
economies. The underlying reasons for such findings are the absence of infrastructure,
stable government and presence of corruption.
In recent years, there has been a switch in examining natural resource effect.
Studies have focused on moving away from macro-level analysis to understanding
how extraction of the resource lead to development at the micro-level of countries.
This focus allows for heterogeneous study at the lowest administrative level. However,
the current literature is largely centered on developed economies with little attention
on developing countries, like Ghana that discovered one of the largest oil reserve in
West Africa in over a decade in 2007 and started extraction in 2010.
This thesis comprises of three chapters and each examines the effects of oil
extraction in Ghana and various economic decisions that resulted from it. The
thesis uses data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey which is a nationwide
survey conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service in collaboration with the World
Bank. The first chapter examines how oil extraction made it possible for the
government of Ghana to implement a new wage policy -the Single Spine Pay Policy-
for public sector workers. By adopting a novel unconditional quantile estimation
within a difference-in-differences framework, the chapter examines the significance
and effectiveness of this policy in addressing wage disparities and more importantly
productivity of public sector workers. The study finds that the policy largely affected
public sector workers at the lower tail of the earnings distribution. Female workers
in the education and health sub-sectors and male workers in the administration
sub-sector were the largest beneficiaries. However, there was a reduction in the level
x
of productivity for public sector workers largely from the beneficiaries of the gains in
earnings.
The second chapter examines spillover effects of oil extraction on income,
employment and migration in Ghana. To capture the spillover effects, individuals
living in districts closer to the oil extraction area are used as treated group and those
living further away (about 250km) are used as control group. The study employs
a difference-in-differences strategy and finds that there is, on average, a positive
spillover effect on the income of individuals living closest to the oil extraction area.
These effects decrease for income and migration but increase for employment, the
further away an individual is from the oil extraction area. Moreover, the spillover
effects are heterogeneous and vary by gender and sector. The positive effect on
income observed is largely for men and workers in the agricultural and retail sectors.
Migrants are mostly women and workers in retail and other services. There is a
significant reduction in agriculture and service sectors employment but an increase
in the manufacturing sector. The findings suggest that oil extraction in the south of
Ghana deepens the economic disparities that exist between the north and south of
Ghana.
The third chapter examines the effect of oil extraction on the well being of
households. Existing empirical literature examining impact of natural resources at
the micro level, undertake a partial analysis of the well being with most focused
on average estimation with no consideration for changes along the distribution of
these outcomes. This study employs an unconditional quantile technique using
the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) in a difference-in-differences framework.
Examining oil effect along the distribution of expenditure, the study uses households
in close proximity to the oil extraction area as treated group and households further
away as control group. The study finds that oil extraction has a positive effect at low
expenditure levels or on poor households, but negative effects at high expenditure or
on rich households. These results are broadly consistent with microeconomic theory
predictions given a downward sloping oil extraction effect on households’ expenditure
share on food and an upward slope on non-food expenditure share.
xi
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Natural resource extraction contributes to the development and growth of economies.
These resources serve as inputs and in return generate fiscal revenues and exports for
governments and earnings for individuals associated with the extraction. Data from
the World Bank have shown that resource-rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, grew
at an annual average of 2.75 per cent from 1996 to 2014 and one-third of this growth
is attributed to natural resources (World Bank 2018). With increasing discoveries,
the contribution of natural resources like oil stands a greater chance of ensuring
development in the region.
Empirical studies examining the role of natural resources have focused on the
increasing dependence of the resource and their inability to transform lives in low to
middle-income economies (Sachs & Warner 1995, Auty et al. 2001, Gylfason 2006).
The limitation of most of these studies is the aggregation of various heterogeneous
developed and developing economies and importantly the focus at the macro level of
these economies. Such aggregation may result in insignificant estimates. However,
there has been an increase in the focus of micro-level studies but most are largely
on developed economies (Black et al. 2005, Michaels 2010, Marchand 2012, Kumar
2017).
This thesis examines oil extraction effect on developing economies with specific
attention on Ghana. The thesis uses data largely from the Ghana Living Standard
Survey (GLSS) and the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) for empirical analysis, and
supporting data from district level nightlight luminosity gathered from the National
1
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) economy indicators from the
World Bank and country statistics from the Ghana Statistical Service and the Bank
of Ghana. In 2007, Ghana discovered one of the largest oil deposit in Sub-Saharan
Africa off the coast of the Western region and started production in 2010. The area
was estimated to have between 600 million and 1.8 billion barrels of oil (Ayelazuno
2014). Extraction of the new oil fields led at an increase in oil export reserve from
as low as US$ 0.5 billion prior to 2010 to US$ 3.7 billion in 2013 (EIA 2018). The
extraction not only increased the export reserve of the country but also the level of
economic activities as national data show an increase in GDP growth from 6% prior
to 2010 to 9% between 2011 and 2013 (Ghana Statistical Service 2016). This shows
that other non-oil sectors were affected as a results of the oil boom.
Though crude oil has become the recent contributor to the Ghanaian economy,
there are other resources that has put Ghana on the international map. Ghana is
Africa’s second largest producer of Cocoa trailing Cote d’Ivoire and second largest
producer of gold trailing South Africa. Ghana generates high levels of export revenue
from these products. In 2010 exports value was USD 7.73 billion, gold and cocoa
beans made up about 45% and 24% of total exports respectively. This proportion
changed the following year with the two products making up 29% and 18%. Crude
oil exports made up about 19% of total export overtaking cocoa as the second major
export for the Ghanaian economy. In 2014 total exports was valued at USD 10.2
billion and crude petroleum became the largest contributor to total export in Ghana
making up 26% against 22% from gold and 23% from cocoa beans (OEC 2018).
Imports, on the other hand, have been largely dominated by crude and refined
petroleum, food items, machinery and luxurious goods like cars. In 2010, total
imports were valued at USD 10.2 billion with crude and refined petroleum making
up 4.2% and 2.6% respectively (OEC 2018). Food items made up majority of total
imports. In 2014, total import increased to USD 14.8 billion with refined petroleum
share of import being at 15%. This was as a result of increased import of machinery
and cars (1.9%) (OEC 2018).
The increased net import value is as a result of increased consumption of foreign
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goods. The increasing trend in import is necessitated by rising levels of income and
most importantly stability in the economy. Ghana is mostly seen as a model for
other African economies and this has been beneficial to the growth of the Ghanaian
economy.
The first chapter of the thesis investigates how the government of Ghana, from
2011, used part of the revenue generated from the oil production to implement a wage
policy, Single Spine Pay Policy, for public sector workers. The policy had two (2)
objectives: (1) to address existing wage disparities between and among workers in the
public sector as compared to private sectors workers, (2) to increase productivity in
the public sector. The disparities were widespread from gender to sectoral differences.
The existing wage disparities led to instances of strikes and this affected the level
of productivity. Baah & Reilly (2009) find that civil servants lost as high as 31
days of work due to strikes. Considering the heterogeneity in the pay disparities,
the chapter employs a novel unconditional quantile estimation technique proposed
by Powell (2016) within a difference-in-differences framework. The choice of this
estimation technique rests on the assumption that the quantiles of the outcomes can
be estimated given the limited number of surveys used (3 surveys) and the technical
efficiency in estimating quantiles. The approach by Powell estimates a non-additive
fixed effect, which means that the fixed effects are absorbed and not estimated at
every quantile, giving an accurate estimate of the model. This is contrary to the
additive fixed effect estimation by Canay (2011) which takes a difference between
the outcome variable and the fixed effects for every quantile specified. As can be
inferred from the technique, the approach by Powell makes use of panel data. Given
the surveys are repeated cross-section, the chapter employs a pseudo-panel technique
proposed by Deaton (1985). This data technique groups the sample into cohorts using
individual time-invariant characteristics; year of birth, gender and ethnicity. Averages
of each cohorts time-varying variables are used as observations. Discrete time-varying
variables are used as reported for the reason that they are rid of errors (Deaton 1985).
The cohorts created from the time-invariant characteristics are then used as cohort
fixed effects. The thesis finds that the government achieved its objective of reducing
3
the wage disparities but this was only at lower end of the earning distribution where
majority were women and workers in education and health sectors. On the other
hand, the governments objective of increasing productivity fell short with a reduction
largely from the beneficiaries of the earnings gain.
The second chapter examines spillovers from the oil extraction into local labour
markets. The oil boom will not only result in revenue to the government but also
lead to local effects in other non-oil sectors of the economy. For this reason, the
thesis analyses a possible spillover on income and employment for workers in non-oil
sectors and migration into areas close to oil extraction sites. A positive effect will
ensure development in the locality as a result of the oil extraction and vice versa. To
capture the spillovers from the oil extraction, the study assigns treatment status to
individuals living in districts closer to the oil extraction area and uses as a control
group, individuals in distant districts from the area. The choice of control group
is not arbitrary but chosen using the Synthetic Control Approach (SCA) of Abadie
et al. (2010). By this approach, the study uses individuals in regions with estimated
weights based on similar economic indicators gathered from the three (3) GLSS
survey reports. Thus, the study employs a SCA in selecting a control group and
a difference-in-differences framework to estimate the mean spillover effect on the
outcomes. The study finds positive spillovers on income and migration but a negative
spillover on employment. Furthermore, the magnitude of these effects decreases with
distance from the oil extraction area. The spillovers are heterogeneous with respect
to the gender and sector of the individual. Men and agricultural workers had the
largest positive spillover on their income whereas women and retail workers migrated
the most. Employment spillover was generally negative for the treated sample but was
positive for the manufacturing sector. These estimated effects are robust to different
specifications and the possibility of growth in Ghana. They are also immune to
missing individual unobserved heterogeneity in the model, which may result in biased
estimates. By following Oster (2017), the study finds that the included covariates,
districts, region and survey year fixed effects are enough to explain the estimated
spillover effects. This solidification of the identification strategy and the confidence
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in the estimates show that oil extraction has the potential of positively affecting the
lives of individuals that live closer to the extraction area.
The third chapter examines the well-being of the individuals in the selected
districts. Individuals and households have the tendency to spend the incomes earned
from the economic activities differently and this could help explain how beneficial
the natural resource has been to them. The chapter investigates this possibility by
examining the oil effect on household expenditure. Household expenditure serves as
a better proxy to understand household wellbeing, because it shows the households
ability to spend from savings and assets. The innovative contribution of this chapter
to the literature is not only the focus on a developing economy but the distributional
estimation of oil effect. The study follows Firpo et al. (2009)’s unconditional
quantile estimation technique which adopts the Recentered Influence Function (RIF)
approach. The idea of the approach is to estimate the unconditional quantiles of the
model by accounting for the distributional influence of not only the outcome variable
but also the explanatory variables. The estimated results are therefore not only
from a within-group variation but also between group-variation. Using this approach
within a difference-in-differences framework, the study finds that poor households or
those at low expenditure had a positive oil impact on their consumption whereas
rich households or those at the high distribution had a negative impact. The study
further finds that poor households expenditure are mostly on food items but rich
households spend more on non-food items in the presence of a shock. Moreover, the
gained effects of poor households fade away with increasing regional price levels which
are mostly for food items. The study therefore concludes that rich households are
major beneficiaries of the oil extraction in Ghana.
The remainder of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the effectiveness
of the Single Spine Pay Policy meant to address wage disparities and productivity in
the public sector, and made possible by the revenue from the oil extraction. Chapter
3 examines the possibility of spillover effects of oil extraction into local labour market.
Chapter 4 analyses the well-being of households in the presence of oil extraction in
Ghana. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis. Chapters 2-4 are stand-alone papers, each
5
with a reference and an appendix.
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Pay Differentials: The Single Spine
Pay Policy as a Natural
Experiment in Ghana
Akwasi Ampofo Firmin Doko Tchatoka




Empirical studies have documented the existence of the public-private pay
differentials in both developed and developing countries. The implementation of
policies aiming to reduce this gap has, however, been mitigated or inconclusive. This
paper exploits the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) in Ghana as a natural experiment
to examine the effectiveness of wage policies in developing countries. The SSPP was
implemented in 2010 by the Government of Ghana to address the public-private
sector wage gap and improve productivity in the public sector. Using a quantile
treatment effect approach based on a difference-in-differences estimation, we show
that the SSPP has yet to reduce the wage gap between the public and private sectors
across the entire distribution of earnings in Ghana. The improvement observed is
only at the lower tail of the distribution of earnings. However, the SSPP has a
larger effect on the earnings of female workers than that of males in the education
and health services sector, suggesting that the policy was successful in reducing
the gender-wage gap in that sector but widened the gap in the administration
sub-sector. Moreover, the SSPP has decreased the productivity of workers across
the distribution of earnings, mainly due to a decrease in the effort of female public
sector workers in the education and health sub-sectors and male workers in the
administration sub-sector. Nevertheless, the SSPP has had some successes and
could be improved by putting in place a good managerial quality in the government
agencies. In addition, it is important that the Government pays much attention to
various macroeconomic factors that have challenged the success of the SSPP.
Key words: Public sector; Efficiency wage theory; Quantile treatment effect model;
DID estimation.
JEL classification: C31, G15, J24, J31, J45.
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2.1 Introduction
The implementation of policies aiming to reduce the public-private sector wage gap
have received considerable attention in recent years, especially in developed countries
(Lausev 2014). Bregn (2013) finds that 80 percent of employers in the OECD
economies have either implemented such a wage policy or intended to do so, with
the purpose of not only addressing the wage differential but also to increase workers’
productivity (Bajorek & Bevan 2015). Their success, however, has been mitigated or
inconclusive. While some studies found that adopting a wage policy increases earnings
in the public sector (Hasnain & Pierskalla 2012), their effects on productivity have
not been addressed. Bryson et al. (2012), Lucifora & Origo (2015) argued that wage
policies increase workers’ productivity marginally, but their studies remain silent on
how such policies correct wage disparities between sectors. Most studies on wage gap
often focus on the private sector and little attention is usually paid to the public
sector; e.g. (Prentice et al. 2007). Despite the progress made by many countries in
recent years to close the public-private sector wage gap, the realisation of this goal
remains a challenge especially in developing economies. The few developing countries
that implemented wage policies, such as Ghana, have no clear scientific measure of
their success.
This study aims to fill this gap by using the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP)
in Ghana as a natural experiment to examine the effects of wage policies in
developing countries. In particular, we investigate whether such a policy reduces
the public-private sector wage gap, while achieving maximum productivity. Using
the private sector as a control group, we employ a quantile treatment effect approach
based on a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation to show that the SSPP has yet
to reduce the public-private sector wage gap across the entire distribution of earnings
in Ghana. The improvement observed is only at the lower tail of the distribution
of earnings. Nevertheless, the SSPP has a larger effect on the earnings of female
workers than that of males in the education and health sub-sectors of the public
sector, suggesting that the policy was successful in reducing the gender-wage gap in
those sub-sectors of the public sector but widened the gender pay gap in favour of
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male public sector workers in the administration sub-sector. Moreover, the policy
has decreased the productivity of workers across the effort distribution, mainly due
to a decrease in the effort of female public sector workers in the education and health
sub-sectors and male workers in the administration sub sector. Nevertheless, we find
the policy effect on earnings to be positive for public sector workers when we estimate
our model with self-employed individuals as the control group but highly negative
with formal private sector employees. This systematic difference in the effect is as a
result of the small scale nature of self employed individuals and the inconsistency in
their earnings which is as a result of the general demand for their goods and services.
Our findings are similar to Damiani et al. (2016) who estimate a positive policy
effect across the quantiles of earnings and productivity of Italians firms. While,
Damiani et al. (2016) find a positive U-shaped curve, we find a (near) U-shaped
distributional policy effect on earnings but a downward distributional effect on
workers’ productivity. When considering gender differences, we find that the SSPP
has a positive and near U-shaped effect on earnings of females workers but a downward
distributional effect on that of males. In addition, the SSPP has a downward effect
on the productivity of female workers, while its effect on that of male workers is
an inverted W-shape. Across different sub-sectors, the policy effect on earnings is
near W-shaped for education and health services workers but U-shaped for female
workers in the sub-sector. Moreover, the effect is downward sloping for administration
sub-sector but near W-shaped for both males and females in that sub-sector.
Overall, our findings do not align with the literature on efficiency wage theory
that postulates an increase in workers’ productivity after the implementation of wage
policies. The efficiency wage theory assumes that a higher wage will result in increased
effort, thus leading to an increase in productivity. The reasons for such a relationship
are that, first, high-paid workers would not shirk knowing the opportunity cost of
being fired or losing their wages (Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984, Alexopoulos 2002). Second,
as a form of showing appreciation and gratitude to employers, employees will respond
positively to an increase in wages with an increase in effort, thus leading to higher
productivity (Akerlof 1982, 1984). Lastly, if workers perceive a given wage as fair,
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there is a high chance they will increase their effort, which in turn will increase their
productivity (Akerlof & Yellen 1990).
However, our results are in line with the literature on economics of vocation which
states that it is costly to pay more to workers in a vocation-intensive sector like
education and health services given they have an internal desire to provide their
services (Heyes 2005). However, when workers do not perceive their work as a
vocation, their intrinsic motivation for the work is far less than the external incentives
in the form of salary given to them (Frey 1993). When workers are motivated by
external incentives like surviving and the desire to satisfy their everyday needs, there
is less morale to increase their effort even with an increase in earnings.
By emphasizing on identifying the causal effect of wage policies, our study
contributes to the existent literature on efficient wage policies, and also shed a new
light on the disparity between developed and underdeveloped countries on this topic.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to empirically examine the effect of
wage policies in sub-Saharan countries using the novel causal quantile treatment effect
approach recently proposed by Powell (2016), along with the difference-in-differences
estimation. First, by conditioning on workers’ unobservable characteristics, we are
able to identify the causal effect of the wage policy, despite the presence of other
confounding factors which may have contributed to changes in earnings during the
period. Second, most studies of wage policies in the public sector have been limited
to workers in the health and education sectors (Makinson 2000, Prentice et al.
2007). By contrast, our analysis of the wage policy effectiveness covers the whole
public sector. Third, by distinguishing heterogeneous sub-groups of workers, our
results show that the effect of the SSPP is not uniform across these sub-groups. In
particular, while women and low-income workers benefited from the policy, males
and high-income workers did benefit less, which indicates clearly that the mean-type
regression analysis, as often done in the literature, may not be an appropriate way
to investigate this type of policies. Moreover, from a methodological viewpoint, an
interesting contribution of our study is the use of pseudo panels. The absence of
genuine panel data covering all areas in Ghana makes it difficult to have individual
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observations on workers over time. Following Deaton (1985), we construct a panel
data with individual time-invariant characteristics such as year of birth, gender, and
ethnic composition of workers.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
background and a brief description of the SSPP. Section 2.3 introduces the data and
the variables used in the study. Section 2.4 details our empirical strategy. Section 2.5
discusses the findings and we present some robustness checks in Section 2.6. Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 The Single Spine Pay Policy in Ghana
Ghana is a West African country with a population of about 27.4 million, with
around 49.75 percent of the population being men (World Bank 2017). The economy
of Ghana was predominantly agrarian but recent developments have seen the services
and other sectors contributing largely towards its development. The contribution of
the agricultural sector to total GDP (Figure 2.1a) has decreased from 49.92 percent
in 1965 to 19.60 percent in 2013, while the share of the services sector has increased
from 28.79 to 52.24 percent during the same period (World Bank 2017).
The introduction of democratic rule in 1992, along with subsequent economic
reforms, have spurred the expansion of new enterprises, mostly in the private sector.
While this rapid development of the private sector has improved earnings for workers,
as most private sector employers pay higher wages, the same is yet to be materialized
in the public sector. Several studies have found that the public-private pay differential
was between 15 to 20 percent prior to 2010 (Glewwe 1991, Verner 1999, Baah &
Reilly 2009). This differential was worse for workers on the lower tail of earnings’
distribution. Several wage negotiations to address this issue fell through, leading to
numerous strikes and a fall in workers hours of work and productivity. Baah & Reilly
(2009) evidenced that the hazard rate of strikes is positively related to the strike
duration in Ghana. More precisely, their results indicate a higher rate of strikes
lasting as long as 30 days (Figure 2.1b). In addition, they also found that between
1980 and 2004, the public sector had lost on average 5.8 days of work per year as a
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result of strikes compared to 3.3 days per year in the private sector.
Over decades of failed attempts to address the public-private pay gap and improve
workers’ productivity in the public sector, the Government of Ghana introduced the
Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) and implemented it on January 1, 2010. In addition
to addressing the public-private sector wage gap, the SSPP aimed not only to reduce
the strikes in the public sector and the frequency of wage negotiations, but also
to retain skilled workers in the public sector (FWSC 2009). To the government,
achieving these objectives were a probable way of containing the cost of the public
sector wage bill and ensuring that public sector workers productively spend 8 hours
a day and 40 hours a week.
The issue of rising wage bill brings to mind how the Government of Ghana
intended to finance the SSPP. In 2007, the Government of Ghana discovered new
oil fields on the coast of the Western region. Extraction and large scale sale of the
new oil started in 2010 bringing in oil rents for the government. Figure 2.1c shows
the GDP growth of Ghana and the share of oil rents to total GDP. The average oil
rents share to total GDP was about 0.05 percent during the period 2002 to 2010, but
bounced to 4.88 percent in 2011. The late receipt of the rents saw the government
paying off arrears to the public sector workers from 2011.
However, while well intentioned, the SSPP may not have a significant impact on
the earnings in the public sector due to the expansionary trend in the GDP per capita
since 1992 (Figure 2.1d). This increase may be attributed to many factors such as the
establishment of new enterprises (as mentioned earlier). Therefore, the rising earnings
may be a reflection of the increasing trend in the performance of the economy, rather
than the impact of new oil discoveries which facilitated the implementation of the
policy. This study aims to clarify this issue by proposing an econometric strategy to
identify the causal effect of the SSPP.
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2.3 Data
We use data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS), rounds 4,5 and 6
conducted in 1998, 2006 and 2013 respectively. This means there are two pre-policy
(1998, 2006) and one post-policy (2013) data points. This is a national representative
and one of the largest repeated cross-section dataset with 5998 households in 1998,
8687 in 2006, and 16772 in 2013, surveyed across the 10 regions of Ghana (Ghana
Statistical Service 2016).1 The data include household socioeconomic characteristics
and a roster of members in the household, their employment status, their sector of
work, their earnings, their hours of works, their ages and educational attainment,
ethnic composition and other demographic variables. We restrict our sample to only
respondents above 15 years and employed.2
As the GLSS is a repeated cross-section data, the unavailability of a panel form
makes it difficult to follow the respondents over time. We tackle this challenge by
constructing a pseudo panel (Deaton 1985). The approach is such that respondents
are grouped into cohorts according to the same time invariant characteristics that
identify them. We then compute averages of continuous time-varying variables for
each cohort across each survey and used them as observations. Discrete time varying
variables like marital status and household status (head or not) are, however, used
as reported because they are considered to be rid of errors (Deaton 1985). The
individual fixed effect which identifies the unobserved heterogeneity in a panel data
is then referred to as a cohort fixed effect. Though this is not necessarily following
individuals over time but rather cohorts, it makes it possible to infer individuals’
behavior from a group with similar characteristics. In the literature, the widely
used time-invariant characteristics to construct cohorts have been the birth year
and gender. We use these variables for the reasons that they depict the life-cycle
and existing wage differentials between and among workers. The well-known Mincer
(1974) wage equation considers age (experience) as an important determinant of
1The GLSS has a wider coverage than the Ghana Household Urban Population Survey which is
a panel and covers only the urban cities in Ghana.
2This is because by the International Labour Law, working at age below 15 years is a child
labour.
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earnings, and this was proven to be the case in Ghana (Glewwe 1991). Glewwe
(1991) found that the age-earning profile depicts the experience and earning profile
of workers, and that even within the same age-earning profile, there exists a pay
differential by gender. Various studies, Newell & Reilly (1996), Cohen & Huffman
(2007) and Aizer (2010) also found that the gender wage gap exists in both developed
and developing countries, mostly in favor of men.
Figure 2.2: Regions and Distribution of Major Ethnic Groups in Ghana
(a) Regions in Ghana (b) Ethnic demography
In addition to year of birth and gender, we also construct cohorts using the ethnic
composition of the respondents. The use of the ethnic composition to construct
cohorts is inspired by Easterly & Levine (1997), who investigated the effect of ethnic
diversity on economic development in both developed and developing countries.
They found that diversity of ethnic backgrounds in most countries (developed
and developing) influences the differences in income and productivity. Easterly &
Levine (1997) argue that these differences arise from various innate capabilities that
characterise each ethnic group, making ethnicity an important factor to consider
when estimating earnings and productivity.
The Ghanaian population is very diverse with different ethnic groups. This
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diversity affect their upbringing and this is reflected in their years of education, choice
of work, and their earnings (Easterly & Levine 1997, Le 1999, Swee 2015). Across
Ghana, the ethnic groups are widely dispersed in the regions. However, each region is
very well represented by a major ethnic group and this affects the economic activity
of the people in that region. The majority of the population belong to the Akan
ethnic group and this is clearly seen in Figure 2.2.3 The Dagbanis and the Ewes are
the next most populous ethnic groups followed by the Ga-Adamgbes who are mostly
found in the Greater Accra region. The northern part of Ghana is mostly occupied
by minor ethnic groups with similar cultural orientation. The Dagbanis, Gonjas, and
the Guans make up the majority of the population in the Northern part of Ghana.
Other ethnic groups like the Gursi and Gurma are mostly found in the Upper East
and West of Ghana. These groups and other minor ones are widely dispersed in the
3 northern regions.
In forming cohorts, it is necessary to ensure that there is enough heterogeneity in
the groups. This requirement calls for larger cohort size and groups. The restriction
on the available data makes it difficult to ensure these two requirements are satisfied,
which usually leads to a trade-off between efficiency and bias. This is because a larger
cohort size will reduce the number of groups (thus rendering the estimates efficient
but biased), whereas a small cohort size and a larger number of groups will result in
less efficient estimates but rid of bias. Verbeek & Nijman (1992) note that the main
problem of cohort fixed effect is that it is time-varying, unobserved and very likely
to be correlated with the averages of the variables. With the average cohort effect
varying over time, treating them as random will result in inconsistent estimates, and
treating them as fixed will lead to identification problems unless the variation of the
cohort effect over time can be neglected. However, with cohorts sizes of at least 100,
there is a chance of having the errors resulting from averaging the variables being
neglected, and the estimates being consistent (Verbeek & Nijman 1992).
We form the cohorts, first, by combining all ethnic groups with less than 1,000
3These proportions are estimated using the 3 surveys. Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix
show the distribution of earnings per ethnic group and the distribution of ethnic groups in the
public sector respectively in our sample.
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respondents as Others. This group together with the Akan, Ewe, Ga-Adamgbe, Guan
and Mole-Dagbani make up 6 ethnic groups. We then form the year of birth cohort by
using different year intervals (25, 16, 6) so as to have an equal proportion (16 percent)
of respondents in each cohort. Using equal year intervals will leave some year cohorts
with fewer respondents. We finally form the cohorts from 6 ethnic groups, 6 birth
years and 2 gender groups giving us 72 groupsin each survey.4 Sixteen (16) percent
of the total created cohorts have less than 100 respondents; this is tolerable from the
literature on pseudo panel construction.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
To identify the effect of the SSPP, we use a quantile treatment approach along with a
difference-in-differences estimation. Section 2.4.1 details the specification used, while
Section 2.4.2 discusses briefly the identification issues related to this type of models.
2.4.1 Model Specification
We consider the following quantile treatment effect framework (Powell 2016):
Y ct = (PUB × POL)′β(Uct) +X
′
ctγ(Uct) + at(Uct) + rc(Uct) + sc(Uct) (2.1)
Uct = f(Ac, Vct), (2.2)
where Y ct refers to the average of the outcome variables—log of monthly labour
earnings or log of weekly hours of work (effort)—of cohort c at time t; (PUB×POL)
is our variable of interest—PUB and POL are indicators for public sector and period
after the SSPP—with coefficient of interest β(Uct) measuring the effect of the SSPP on
monthly earnings or effort of workers; Xct is a vector of covariates—years of education,
years of experience and demographic factors—and its coefficient γ measures the effect
of a change in these covariates on log of monthly earnings or log of weekly hours of
work; at, rc and sc are year, regional, and industry-specific fixed effects respectively,
4Other groups were also constructed but most of the cohorts size were less than 100 and had less
heterogeneity in them. Details of the variables used are included in Tables A.1-A.4 of the Appendix.
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that address any potential endogeneity in the variable of interest, (PUB×POL). Uct
denotes time-invariant and time-varying characteristics, modelled as a function of the
cohort fixed effects Ac and the idiosyncratic shocks Vct. It is worth noting that the
policy effect, β(Uct) is time-varying as Uct incorporates time-varying characteristics.
The monthly earnings used in the regressions only cover the work done within a
month (in both the private and public sector). In the survey, respondents were
asked to report their earnings from both the main and secondary jobs. We use only
the earnings from the primary job for two reasons. First, there are many missing
observations in the secondary jobs data, and second, the main job earnings suffice
to achieve our objectives. The underlying assumption is that for PUB × POL to
be exogenous, there should not be any information provided about Uct conditional
on Xct, i.e Uct|PUB × POL,Xct has zero τ quantile. This means that, changes in
PUB×POL and Xct are uncorrelated with changes in Uct when the cohort effects are
controlled for. This implies that the structure of the rank is conditionally stable and
yields the distribution of Y ct|(PUB×POL), Xct. The function Uct is often called the
rank variable and it indicates the variation in the coefficients β(Uct) and γ(Uct) at the
τ -quantile of Y ct. Therefore, Uct indicates how these coefficients are to be interpreted
in the quantile regression. The rank structure is useful in defining the distribution
of the potential outcomes, thus workers with high quantiles have high value of Uct
which is a function of their cohort and idiosyncratic effects. The assumption on the
rank structure is commonly used in the literature, and allows for recovering the joint
distribution from the marginal ones. Each observation is assumed to maintain its rank
in the distribution of earnings and effort regardless of the treatment status so that the
estimated effect is the treatment effect for observations at the quantile of the potential
outcome distributions (Melly & Wüthrich 2016). This rank assumption is different
from that with additive fixed effects. While the former yields the estimation of the
distribution of Y ct|PUB × POL,Xct, the latter approach only yields the estimation
on the distribution of (Y ct − Uct)|PUB × POL,Xct. This means that in the latter,
individuals at the bottom of the distribution (Y ct − Uct)|PUB × POL,Xct may be
closer to the top of the distribution Y ct|PUB×POL,Xct, thus contradicting the rank
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assumption. Interestingly, Powell (2016) methodology of estimating the quantiles of
Y ct|PUB × POL,Xct yields consistent estimates even for short T (T = 3 in this
study), which is an advantage over quantile regressions with additive fixed effects
that require large T .
Conditioning on covariates like educational attainment and years of experience
matters in the determination of earnings and productivity; e.g., Mincer (1974),
Glewwe (1991), and Adamchik & Bedi (2000). Other factors like marital status,
household head status, and father’s working status also influence earnings (Le 1999).
Ignoring these variables will result in a misspecified model, thus leading to imprecise
estimates (Powell 2016).
The year fixed effects help in capturing various economic and political happenings
that have evolved over time. Ignoring the activities of government which could in a
way influence the earnings of workers will affect the identification of the policy effect.
One interesting factor that made it possible for the implementation of the policy was
the availability of an extra source of funding for the government as a result of an oil
discovery in 2007. A new source of funding was needed as the government did not
have stored up funds to embark on such a huge expenditure. The performance of
the economy prior to the SSPP implementation, as noted by the World Bank, was
declining. The growth rate increased from 6 percent in 2010 to 14 percent in 2011
(Figure 2.1c, Section 2) and declined to 9 percent the following year World Bank
(2017). This shock could be attributed to the discovery and extraction of new oil
fields from 2010. This discovery may make the policy endogenous and not accounting
for this may result in an inefficient estimation of the policy effect. One way to address
this, is to have a time dummy for the period of the oil discovery. The data available
does not allow to have a different time dummy for the period after oil discovery and
the pay policy. However, the inclusion of the year fixed effect helps to address this
problem. Another way is the inclusion of regional effects which will account for the
economic activities that evolved after the oil discovery.
The inclusion of the cohort fixed effect and industry-specific fixed effect is of essence
as this helps in not attributing the effect of time invariant traits to the policy.
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The literature on efficiency wages considers working hours as a measure of effort.
(Katz 1986, Campbell 2006). Effort, according to the literature, is positively related
to the level of productivity of a firm or an individual. In Ghana, workers are by
law required to work 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week for a full time work.5 This
is admonished in the public sector and it was a reason for the government agreeing
to a new pay policy. The believe is that, effectively working within this stipulated
hours will result in higher level of productivity and result in a cut in employment in
the public sector. This institutional setting renders it possible to measure the effort
of workers, thus their level of productivity, through hours of work. Considering the
unavailability of a better measure of productivity from the individual data, and more
importantly the underlying theory, we use hours of work as an ‘indirect ’ measure of
productivity. We propose two approaches in measuring effort. First, we use log of
weekly hours of work. This approach is deemed appropriate as it is easier to capture
a possible change in effort on average and also at the quantiles. Next we use a dummy
that takes 1 if an individual works at least 40 hours a week (more productive worker)
and 0 otherwise (less productive worker).
We estimate the difference-in-differences model using the Generalized Methods
of Moments(GMM) approach by Powell (2016) with two moment conditions. The
first is the within transformation of the data which ensures that the within cohorts
comparison is used for identification. The second moment condition ensures that,
on average, the expected probability of each cohort is equal to the quantile function.









(Zct − Zcs) [1(Y ct ≤ q(Dct, τ))− 1(Y cs ≤ q(Dcs, τ))]
}
= 0 (2.3)
E [1(Y ct ≤ q(Dct, τ))− τ ] = 0, (2.4)
where Zct and Zcs are instruments in cohort c at time t and s, D is the treatment
variable, PUB×POL , τ is the τ -quantile of Y ct, and q(Dcs, τ) is a strictly increasing
function of τ . The GMM estimator obtained by using the two moments conditions in
5See Ghanaian Labour Act 2003, Section on hours of work.
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(Zct − Zc) [1(Y ct ≤ q(Dct, τ))]
]
= 0 (2.5)





























c=1 1(Y ct ≤ D′ctb) ≤ τ for all t
}
, b ≡ [β(τ)′ , γ(τ)′ ]′,
W (b) is a weighting matrix, and N is the size of cohorts. Restricting the parameters
to B guarantees that the condition Y ct ≤ D′ctb holds for (approximately) 100τ% of the
observations in each time period. We use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm
(MCMC) to solve the optimization problem, as suggested by Powell (2016).
2.4.2 Threat to Identifying a Significant Policy Effect
The source of a policy variation needs to be understood better in order to avoid
making erroneous inferences (Besley & Case 2000). A change in the monthly earnings
and weekly hours of work could be as a result of series of factors but not necessarily
the policy. Also, an important factor to consider is the control group with which
the treated group is being compared to. The private sector is an equally viable
option for public sector workers provided they find their efforts not to be rewarded
accordingly. We use the private sector as a control group because there is a fear that
the government will lose its workers to this sector, but not the other way around
(FWSC 2009). Although there is job security in the public sector, the monetary gain
is a clear cut for workers to move to the private sector (Adamchik & Bedi 2000).
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From that perspective, we are interested in the existence of factors that could result
in changes in monthly earnings and effort in favour of either the public or private
sector.
Table 2.1: Pre-Policy Descriptive Statistics
Variables Total Private Sector Public Sector Diff P-Value
Log of Monthly Earnings 3.907∗∗∗ 4.066∗∗∗ 3.747∗∗∗ 0.318 0.244
(0.061) (0.009) (0.114) (0.274)
Log of Hours of Work 3.807∗∗∗ 3.816∗∗∗ 3.798∗∗∗ 0.017 0.617
(0.014) (0.027) (0.001) (0.035)
Years of Education 7.572∗∗∗ 7.374∗∗∗ 7.769∗∗∗ 0.394 0.591
(0.037) (0.023) (0.579) (0.733)
Experience 10.602 10.535 10.789 0.254 0.133
(6.176) (6.197) (6.119) (0.411)
Square of Experience/100 1.505 1.494 1.538 0.045 0.308
(1.596) (1.602) (1.581) (0.209)
Married Workers 0.630 0.545 0.715 0.170 0.212
(0.487) (0.522) (0.451) (0.369)
Male Workers 0.556∗∗ 0.538 0.572 0.033 0.808
(0.272) (0.519) (0.495) (0.371)
Formally Employed Father 0.192 0.077 0.306 0.229 0.073
(0.369) (0.277) (0.461) (0.358)
Observations 12,321 5,433 6,888
Note: Figures reflect averages prior to the policy. Monthly earnings are the earnings reported by the
respondents to the question “What is the amount received for the work done”. The frequency (daily,
weekly, monthly, yearly) to which this amount was paid is also reported. As most workers in Ghana are
paid monthly, we use this unit of measurement. Years of education refers to the average years of formal
education completed. Experience refers to the number of years of actively being working. Married worker
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent is married and 0 otherwise, and similarly for
Male workers. Formally employed Father is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondents’ father
has/had a white collar job. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 2.1 shows the mean differences in the monthly earnings, weekly hours of
work among other explanatory variables of both sectors, prior to the implementation
of the SSPP. The public sector workers seem, on average, to be more educated
and highly experienced than those of the private sector, but such differences are
statistically insignificant to contribute to any change in the monthly earnings and
weekly hours of work. A closer look at the income and effort of workers reveal the
story about unfolding. Figure 2.3 depicts the earnings of workers before and after the
policy. There is an increase in the earnings of the public sector but their weekly hours
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of work have decreased marginally after the SSPP was implemented. The distribution
of the earnings in these two sectors, as depicted show that the public sector earnings
are concentrated around the mean after the policy was introduced, with a reduction in
the distribution towards the lower tail. This indicates homogeneity in the earnings of
most workers in that sector, and similarly for the private sector. Regarding the weekly
hours of work in Figure 2.4, the distribution did not change much for both sectors
but a large fraction of workers have their weekly hours of work close to the mean after
the SSPP was implemented. This, however, may not be enough in establishing the
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Weekly Work Hours
























Private Sector Public Sector










3 3.5 4 4.5
Log of Weekly Hours of Work











3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4
Log of Weekly Hours of Work
Public Sector Private Sector
After Policy
(b) Distribution of weekly hours of work
absence of selections on unobservable factors. We thus conduct placebo tests, as well
as other robustness checks in section 2.6.2 to ensure the estimates are well identified.
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2.5 Results
For clarity, we present the effects of the SSPP on earnings and effort on separate
sections.
2.5.1 Policy Effect on Earnings
Table 2.2 shows the estimates of the policy effect on log of monthly earnings. The OLS
and pooled quantile estimates based on Koenker & Bassett Jr (1978) are presented
in Table 2.2.I and Table 2.2.II, whereas Table 2.2.III shows the quantile fixed effect
(QRPD) estimates using the approach by Powell (2016). The estimates in Table 2.2.I
with no individual controls and cohort effects suggest the SSPP has a positive and
statistically significant effect on average, and also across the earnings distribution,
except at the 90th quantile. Including controls for workers education, years of
experience, marital status, household status (head or not), and fathers’ choice of
work (white collar job or not), reduces the policy effect on average and also across
quantiles of the distribution (Table 2.2.II). The reduction in the effect of the SSPP
after the inclusion of control variables indicates the role individual factors play in
determining earnings. Across the quantiles of the log of monthly earnings, the SSPP
had its highest effect at the lower tail of the distribution and the impact decreases
gradually as the quantiles increase. Figure 2.5 shows the graphs of the estimates in
Table 2.2.II. The difference-in-differences estimates are on the y-axis and the quantiles
of log of monthly earnings on the x -axis. The effect of the policy is significantly above
and below the average effect (OLS), indicating the heterogeneous nature of the policy
on the monthly earnings in the public sector.
These effects, however, reduces with the inclusion of the cohort fixed effects as
shown in Table 2.2.III and in Figure 2.5. The inclusion of the cohort fixed effect
indicates that omitting the unobserved heterogeneity arising from the year of birth,
the gender and ethnic composition, will bias the effect of the SSPP upwards. Another
significant result is that the effect of the SSPP is positive on average but negative and
significant beyond the median quantile; indicating a negative effect on the earnings
of public sector workers. Whereas the SSPP increased the monthly earnings of public
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sector workers at the 10th quantile by 21.45 and 13.24 percentage points for workers
at the 25th quantile, it reduced the monthly earnings of public sector workers at the
75th quantile by 0.56 and 0.48 percentage points for those at the 90th quantile.
Table 2.2 also shows the public-private earnings gap in the absence of the SSPP.
The first row of every panel shows the public sector workers, on average, earn less than
their private counterparts, and also at every quantile of the earnings distribution.
Though not statistically significant on average, these wage gaps are significant at
the lower tails of the earnings distribution, with or without controls. The overall
effect of the SSPP is obtained as the sum of the public-private wage gap and the
difference-in-differences estimate in Table 2.2.III. We see that although the effect of
the SSPP is positive, its objective of addressing the earnings gap was not realised as
the public sector earn between 30 to 90 percent less across the quantiles.
Many studies on this topic often use hourly labour earnings from the main job in
order to control for the number of hours worked. We estimate the model with hourly
labour earnings as outcome variable and present the results in Table 2.3. As seen,
the results are similar to the baseline model reported in Table 2.2. In particular, we
observe an insignificant effect of the policy on average but a significant downward
effect across the quantiles with the overall policy effect being negative.
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Table 2.2: DID estimate of policy effect on log of monthly earnings
Quantiles
I-Pooled QR with no controls OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Public Sector -1.120 -2.221∗∗∗ -1.261∗∗∗ -0.799 -0.742 -0.012
(0.324) (0.425) (0.499) (0.654) (0.191) (0.646)
Public X Policy 2.107∗∗∗ 3.286∗∗∗ 2.489∗∗∗ 1.938∗∗∗ 1.525∗∗∗ 0.418
(0.326) (0.436) (0.496) (0.651) (0.200) (0.649)
Individual controls No No No No No No
Cohort fixed effect No No No No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,473 24,473 24,473 24,473 24,473 24,473
II-Pooled QR with controls
Public Sector -1.628 -2.520∗∗∗ -1.960∗∗∗ -1.380∗∗∗ -1.139∗∗ -0.659∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.119) (0.186) (0.155) (0.188) (0.076)
Public X Policy 1.931 3.173∗∗∗ 2.465∗∗∗ 1.655∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.122) (0.191) (0.149) (0.182) (0.077)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects No No No No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,415 24,415 24,415 24,415 24,415 24,415
III-QRPD FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Public Sector -1.191 -1.520∗∗∗ -1.249∗∗∗ -0.416 -0.035 -0.012
(0.186) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003)
Public X Policy 0.095 1.498∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.122) (0.191) (0.011) (0.008) (0.004)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,579 24580 24,639 24,639 24,639 24,639
Note: We follow Koenker & Bassett Jr (1978) to estimate the pooled quantile regression of parts I and II, and Powell
(2016) for III. Individual controls include workers education, years of experience, marital status, presence of union
at place of work, household status (head or not) and fathers choice of work (white collar job or not). Bootstrapped
Standard errors with 1000 replications in parentheses for parts I and II and MCMC algorithm for III. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.3: DID estimate of policy effect on log hourly earnings
Quantiles
I-Pooled QR with no controls OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Public Sector 0.579∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗ -0.434∗∗ -0.226 -0.063
(0.111) (0.048) (0.117) (0.192) (0.180) (0.231)
Public X Policy 2.107∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 1.525∗∗∗ 0.123
(0.326) (0.051) (0.116) (0.192) (0.180) (0.230)
Individual controls No No No No No No
Cohort fixed effect No No No No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,473 24,473 24,473 24,473 24,473 24,473
II-Pooled QR with controls
Public Sector -0.315 -0.595∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.253∗ -0.289∗ -0.050
(0.095) (0.098) (0.072) (0.143) (0.170) (0.206)
Public X Policy 0.428∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗ -0.003
(0.096) (0.099) (0.072) (0.143) (0.171) (0.209)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects No No No No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,415 24,415 24,415 24,415 24,415 24,415
III-QRPD FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Public Sector -0.027 -0.328∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Public X Policy 0.022 0.324∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,579 24580 24,639 24,639 24,639 24,639
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors with 1000 replications in parentheses for parts I and II and MCMC algorithm for III. ∗
p < 0.1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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2.5.2 Policy Effect on Effort
We examine the effect of the SSPP on the effort of public sector workers. The
estimates using the log of hours of work as outcome variable is presented in Table 2.4.
As before, the OLS and pooled quantile estimates based on Koenker & Bassett Jr
(1978) are presented in Table 2.4.I and Table 2.4.II respectively, whereas Table 2.4.III
shows the fixed effect QRPD estimates using the approach by Powell (2016). The
difference-in-differences estimates with no individual controls and cohort fixed effects
are positive and significant on average and also at the 10th quantile, but negative and
significant at the 90th quantile of weekly hours. This indicates a fall in the effort of
public sector workers after the implementation of the SSPP.
The inclusion of individual controls reduces the effect of the wage policy on public
sector effort on average and also at the 10th quantile. The effect, however, is negative
from the median and only statistically significant at the 90th quantile (Table 2.4.II).
Moreover, the SSPP effect on the effort of public sector workers reduces and turn
negative on average and also beyond the median after including the cohort fixed
effect (Table 2.4.III). Figure 2.7 shows the SSPP effect on the effort of workers.
There is a significant effect of the SSPP below and above the average indicating that
the heterogeneous effect across the quantiles is informative as an average estimate will
disregard the reduction in effort of workers at higher tails of the effort distribution.
Like in the case of monthly earnings, the SSPP did not achieve its objective of
ensuring an increase in the effort and in turn the productivity in the public sector.
The public-private effort gap, without the policy, is significantly positive on average
and also at the 90th quantile (Table 2.4.III). The public sector reduced their effort
by 0.4 percent on average and between 0.1 and 0.3 percent across the quantiles after
implementation of the SSPP.
An alternative approach to test for the effectiveness of the SSPP on effort is to use
a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual works 40 hours or more a week,
and 0 otherwise. We find that the SSPP has, on average, insignificantly reduced the
effort of public sector work by around 10 percent (Table A.6 in the Appendix).
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Table 2.4: DID estimate of the SSPP effects on weekly hours of work
Quantiles
I-Pooled QR with no controls OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Public Sector -0.137 -0.588∗∗∗ -0.154 -0.134 -0.056 0.125
(0.082) (0.100) (0.125) (0.155) (0.144) (0.124)
Public X Policy 0.144∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.154 0.093 0.150 -0.279∗∗
(0.083) (0.114) (0.126) (0.158) (0.145) (0.127)
Individual controls No No No No No No
Cohort fixed effect No No No No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,981 23,981 23,981 23,981 23,981 23,981
II-Pooled QR with controls
Public Sector -0.160∗∗ -0.621∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ -0.013 0.047∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.068) (0.164) (0.214) (0.137) (0.043)
Public X Policy 0.117∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.054 -0.195 -0.214 -0.198∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.071) (0.165) (0.216) (0.138) (0.046)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects No No No No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,927 23,927 23,927 23,927 23,927 23,927
III-QRPD
Public Sector 0.051∗∗∗ -0.049 -0.004 0.027 0.041 0.104∗∗
(0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.003) (0.043)
Public X Policy -0.055∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.0005 -0.028∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,579 24580 24580 24580 24580 24580
Note: Individual controls and cohort fixed effects are the same as in Section 2.5.1. Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 reps.
are in parentheses for parts I and II and the MCMC ones for III.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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2.5.3 Heterogeneity across Gender
The heterogeneity of the effect of the SSPP is not observed only along the distribution
of earnings and effort, but also by gender. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the
difference-in-differences estimates of the policy on earnings and effort for males
(Table 2.5) and females (Table 2.6). The results suggest that the negative effect of
the SSPP on earnings are mainly driven by males. As it is positive and significantly
higher for females, especially at the tails of the earnings distribution. Male public
sector workers experience a negative and significant decrease of their earnings beyond
the median of the distribution.
The magnitude of the public-private pay differential shows that female workers
in the public sector were paid less relative to males workers, and that the policy has
provided a mechanism to resolve this gender-pay gap. The overall effect, however, is
negative on average and also across the distribution of earnings for both males and
females. On average, the public-private wage differential is about 14 percent, and
between 4 to 19 percent across the distribution of earnings. Nevertheless, males in
the public sector are worse off than females after the implementation of the SSPP.
The effect of the SSPP on effort, however, is negative on average for both males
and females, but positive and significant for females at the 10th and 25th quantiles.
At the 90th quantile, the effect of the SSPP on effort is higher and negative for males.
In addition, while the effect of the SSPP is downward sloped for females along the
distribution of effort, that of males is inverted W-shaped (Figure 2.7-(d)).
The objective of the policy to simultaneously reduce the public-private pay and
effort gaps may not be completely unattainable but more work needs to be done to
shape the policy in that direction. For example, the inability of the current form of
the SSPP to catch up with rising earnings in the private sector may be due to the rigid
nature of the pay system in the public sector. Most private sector employers adjust
their employees earnings to changing macroeconomic performance such as inflation
and living standard, which is not the case in the public sector.
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Table 2.5: Policy effect on earnings and effort for males
Male
Quantiles
Log of monthly earnings FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Public Sector -0.410 -1.447∗∗∗ -1.201∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.002) (0.006) (0.021) (0.003) (0.002)
Public X Policy 0.261 1.387∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.002) (0.007) (0.022) (0.003) (0.002)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,744 13,744 13,744 13,744 13,744 13,744
Effort
Public Sector 0.065∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Public X Policy -0.062∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,744 13,744 13,744 13,744 13,744 13,744
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors with 1000 reps. are in parentheses for FE and the MCMC ones for
QRPD.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Policy Effect on Earnings and Effort for Females
Female
Quantiles
Log of monthly earnings FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Public Sector -0.337 -1.611∗∗∗ -1.312∗∗∗ -0.577∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Public X Policy 0.276∗∗∗ 1.593∗∗∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,835 10,836 10,836 10,836 10,836 10,836
Effort
Public Sector 0.014∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Public X Policy -0.019∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,835 10,836 10,836 10,836 10,836 10,836
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors with 1000 reps. are in parentheses for FE and the MCMC ones for
QRPD.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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2.5.4 Disaggregated Control and Treated groups
The public sector representing our treated group can be defined in three ways:
(i) the public administration, (ii) public administration plus public enterprises
(state-owned companies), and (iii) public administration plus public enterprises plus
public education and health-care. Until now, the analysis pooled all these subgroups
together but it is possible that the effect of the SSPP may differs across them, even
if the industry fixed effect is controlled for. We thus estimate the model separately
for: (a) education and health services workers, (b) public administration and public
enterprises workers (due to insufficient data on workers in the public enterprises, we
could not estimated the model for them separately).
Table 2.7 shows a positive and significant overall policy effect on the earnings of
workers in the education and health services at lower quantiles, but a negative effect
at higher quantiles. This positive overall effect is likely due to the positive increase in
the earnings of female workers in education and health services sector. However, the
effect of the policy on earnings of workers in the public administration (see the second
part of Table 2.7) is mostly negative across the distribution of earnings. Nevertheless,
males workers in the public administration sector are largely better off than females
across the quantiles of earnings. These results show that the SSPP was successful in
reducing the gender gap in the education and health services sector, but males workers
have benefited more from the policy in the public administration sector. On the other
hand, the overall effect of the policy on effort is positive and significant across the
distribution of earnings for male workers in the education and health services sector
but positive for female workers in the administration sub sector (see Table 2.8).
Another issue is the break down of the control group (here private sector). In the
public-private wage gap literature some studies divide workers in the private sector
into two comparison groups: (i) private employees and (ii) self-employed individuals.
This allows investigating whether there are systematic differences in the wage gap
between public workers and these two groups of private workers. To address this
issue, we estimate the model separately for the two control groups.
Table 2.9 presents the results. First, we see a positive and significant policy
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effect across the distribution of earnings when private employed individuals is used
as control group, while the policy has a negative and insignificant effect at the 10th,
but significant at the 25th, 75th and 90th quantiles of the distribution of earnings
when self-employees is used as control group. Second, the overall policy effect (sum
of the estimated coefficients on Public Sector and Public X Policy in the table) is
positive with self-employees as control group, but negative with private employed
individuals as control group. However, the positive effect of the policy observed with
self-employees as control group is very weak at the lower quantiles of the distribution
of earnings. These results mean that the SSPP has only reduced the private-public
wage gap in comparison with self-employees at quantiles of the distribution of earnings
but has deepened the gap across the distribution of earnings in comparison with
private employed individuals. The overall positive policy effect in comparison with
self-employees may be explained by the fact that most self employed workers have
inconsistent earnings which is mostly affected by general demand for goods and
services that is partly influenced by macroeconomic factors. Also, most self employed
individuals operate on a small scale affecting their source of earnings. Finally, we
observe that the SSPP has reduced the effort of workers in the public sector in both
sub control groups, a finding in line with our previous analysis.
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Table 2.7: DID estimate of policy effect on Log monthly earnings of workers
Quantiles
FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Education and health services
Full sample
Public Sector 0.049 0.103∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Public X Policy -0.041 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
Male
Public Sector 0.022 -0.003 0.044∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.085) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.010)
Public X Policy 0.005 -0.031∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.029∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.014) (0.009)
Observations 639 639 639 639 639 639
Female
Public Sector 0.062 0.066∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.036 0.015∗ -0.012
(0.069) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
Public X Policy -0.083 0.000 -0.065∗∗∗ -0.069 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.0732) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 555 555 555 555 555 555
Administration
Full sample
Public Sector 0.000 -0.035∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Public X Policy 0.175 0.159∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.214∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗ -0.509∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286
Male
Public Sector 0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Public X Policy 0.373 -0.087∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002)
Observations 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696
Female
Public Sector 0.000 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Public X Policy -0.424 -0.169∗∗∗ -0.0257∗∗∗ -0.884∗∗∗ -0.757∗∗∗ -0.580∗∗∗
(0.432) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 590 590 590 590 590 590
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors with 1000 reps. are in parentheses for FE and the MCMC for
QRPD.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.8: DID estimate of policy effect on effort of workers
Quantiles
FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Education and Health Services
Full sample
Public Sector 0.035∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Public X Policy -0.034∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.0310∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1194 1,194 1,194
Male
Public Sector 0.016 0.004∗∗ 0.002 0.005∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Public X Policy -0.013 0.032∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.007∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Observations 639 639 639 639 639 639
Female
Public Sector 0.029∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Public X Policy -0.029∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 555 555 555 555 555 555
Public Administration
Full sample
Public Sector 0.001 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002)
Public X Policy 0.033 -0.053∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286
Male
Public Sector 0.001 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public X Policy 0.033 -0.053∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696 1,696
Female
Public Sector 0.000 -0.005∗∗∗ 0.00147∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public X Policy -0.050 -0.055∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 590 590 590 590 590 590
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors with 1000 reps. are in parentheses for FE and the MCMC for
QRPD.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9: DID estimate of policy effect with different control groups
Quantiles
FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Self-employees
Log of monthly earnings
Public Sector 0.268∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Public X Policy -0.226∗ -0.003 -0.015∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Effort
Public Sector 0.013∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public X Policy -0.026 0.013∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7284 7284 7284 7284 7284 7284
Private employed individuals
Log of monthly earnings
Public Sector -0.511∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.893∗∗∗ -1.218∗∗∗ -0.929∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Public X Policy 0.475∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Effort
Public sector 0.009 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public X Policy -0.014 0.029∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8772 8772 8772 8772 8772 8772
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors with 1000 reps. are in parentheses for FE and the MCMC for
QRPD.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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2.6 Robustness Checks
2.6.1 Instrumental Variable Estimation of Policy Effect
An important threat to identifying the effect of the SSPP is that it may not be
exogenous, thus resulting to the previous estimates being inaccurate. The activities
of trade unions in the public sector have contributed largely to the implementation of
the SSPP. Therefore, we use the presence of unions at the work place in public sector
as an instrumental variable for the SSPP. The classical IV-diagnostic tests (Table
A.8) indicate clearly that this IV is not poor, so we proceed with the QRPD-IV
estimation. The QRPD-IV estimates are shown in Table 2.10, and Figures 2.8 &
Table 2.10: Instrumental variable estimates
Quantiles
Log of monthly earnings 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Public Sector -1.530∗∗∗ -1.294∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Public X Policy 1.508∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,639 24,639 24,639 24,639 24,639
Effort
Public Sector -0.044∗∗∗ -0.001 0.036∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Public X Policy 0.040∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24639 24639 24639 24639 24639
Note: The instrument for the PublicXPolicy is the presence of unions in the public sector. Standard
errors from the MCMC method are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
4.6 present the graphs of the resulting difference-in-differences estimates along the
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quantiles of monthly earnings and effort, both the full sample [Subfigures (a)] and
the sub-samples of males and females [Subfigures (b)]. The results align qualitatively
with our previous analysis in Section 2.5. Quantitatively, the SSPP has a smaller
effect on monthly earnings at higher tail of the distribution compared with the results
of Section 2.5. Regarding effort, the difference between the QRPD-IV estimates in
Figure 4.6 and that of the standard QRPD estimates in Section 2.2 are quite similar.
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2.6.2 Placebo Test and other Robustness Checks
The identification of the policy effect depends on the validity of the underlying
assumptions. One of this assumption is that there are no confounding factors other
then the SSPP that could actually affect earnings and effort in the public sector,
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once the observed heterogeneity of workers is controlled for. To explicitly test this
assumption, We use a placebo test with fictitious year 2006 as a falsification strategy.
We use 2006 as the year after which the policy was implemented and test the effect
of the SSPP across the quantiles of earnings and effort. If earnings and effort in the
public sector were significantly increasing or decreasing as compared to the private
sector, then the policy effect would be wrongly attributed. We thus expect this
Table 2.11: Placebo test
Quantiles
Log of monthly earnings 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Public Sector -0.041 -0.041 -0.036 -0.040 -0.041
(0.028) (0.062) (0.035) (0.032) (0.511)
Public X Policy2006 -0.094 0.029 0.134 0.170 0.178
(0.159) (0.101) (0.620) (0.166) (1.344)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,321 12,321 12,321 12,321 12,321
Effort
Public Sector -0.006 -0.011 -0.009 -0.013 -0.018
(0.01) (0.013) (0.011) (0.019) (0.015)
Public X Policy2006 0.006 0.015 0.067 0.079 0.081
(0.715) (0.0267) (0.452) (0.524) (0.441)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,321 12,321 12,321 12,321 12,321
Note: We use 2006 as a fictitious year rather than 2013 as the year after the policy was implemented.
Standard errors from the MCMC algorithm are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
pseudo policy not be significant. As shown in Table 2.11, our expectation is met as
the estimates are not significant across the distribution of both the monthly earnings
and effort.
The literature on earnings and productivity argues that earnings and productivity
should increase after a training program (Heckman & Smith 2004, De Grip &
Sauermann 2013, Konings & Vanormelingen 2015). In our case, a significant
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coefficient for a training program after the implementation of the policy will bias
the estimates attributed to the SSPP. To investigate this, we consider workers who
undertook a training program for a month or more after the SSPP was implemented.
This information is available in our data. Table 2.12 presents the QRPD estimates.
Table 2.12: Other robustness test
Quantiles
Log of monthly earnings 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Public X Policy 1.502∗∗∗ -1.201∗∗∗ 0.199∗ -0.039 -0.031
(0.100) (0.125) (0.109) (0.195) (0.131)
Training X Policy -0.0301 -0.0276 0.00056 -0.004 0.039
(0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.0257)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,579 24,580 24,580 24,580 24,580
Effort
Public X Policy 0.048∗ -0.001 -0.031∗ -0.043 -0.110 ∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.031) (0.031)
Training X Policy -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.001 0.008
(0.005) (0.021) (0.022) (0.001) (0.005)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,579 24,580 24,580 24,580 24,580
Note: Standard errors from the MCMC method are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
The effect of the training program is insignificant across the quantiles of both the
monthly earnings and effort, thus suggesting that our analysis in Section 2.5 is likely
not impacted by confounding factors.
2.7 Policy Implications and Concluding remarks
In this study, we examine the effect of the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP)
implemented in 2010 by the Government of Ghana. The SSPP objectives were to: (i)
address the public-private wage gap, and (ii) increase the productivity in the public
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sector. Using a quantile treatment effect approach based on a difference-in-differences
estimation, we show that the SSPP has yet to reduce the public-private sector pay
differentials across the whole distribution of earnings in Ghana. The improvement
observed is mostly at the lower tail of the distribution of earnings. Nevertheless, the
SSPP was successful in reducing the gender-wage gap in the education and health
services sub-sector in favour of females but widened the gap in the administration
sub-sector. The policy has also decreased the productivity of workers, mainly due to
a decrease in the effort of males in the administration sub-sector and females in the
education sub-sectors of the public sector. Our findings are supported by a number of
robustness checks, and the quantile approach adopted shows that examining a policy
effect at the averages may not always be appropriate way as noted by Firpo (2007).
The reduction in the effort after the implementation of the policy, especially by
female workers in the public sector, requires more attention. Indeed, females public
sector workers have seen a major reduction in their hours of work after 2010. The
backward bending nature of their supply curve is mostly seen beyond the 25th quantile
of the distribution of hours of work. Our understanding of this phenomena is that
most females in the public sector with hours of work beyond the 25th quantile are
married and have children. The young and unmarried women are mostly those willing
to spend 8 hours a day at work, as they have less family responsibilities. For example,
Heath (2017) found in urban Ghana that women are likely to reduce their hours of
work when they have children, except if they are self-employed. Another factor that
could also explain the fall in effort in the public sector is the increasing number
of strikes after the implementation of the SSPP. Most public sector workers were
critical of this policy, and this was accentuated by their increase participation in
unions’ activities.
Furthermore, the discrepancies associated with late payments of wages and the
possibility that some workers will not be paid in full, has resulted in a far more severe
strikes in the public sector. This late payments mostly stem from the inconsistencies
in the rents from the oil sale. As shown in Figure 2.1c, the fall in the contribution of
oil rents to total GDP along with the over-dependence on the gains from a volatile
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source have introduced a lot of uncertainties in the pay of public sector workers.
This volatile nature of the oil rents raises the question of whether the SSPP can be
sustained. It is fair to say that the ability of the Ghanaian government to sustain this
policy will largely depend on how it cautiously manages its expenditure, and more
importantly the allocation of its resources towards more diverse productive areas.
Other macroeconomic factors have impacted the success of the SSPP. In
particular, the continuous rise in inflation and daily depreciation of the local currency
do not align with a policy that is revised only at the end of a calendar year. In the
private sector, most firms have policies or measures that facilitate the revision of
wages within a year to account for changing environment and living costs. This is
quasi-nonexistent in the public sector, which does not favor a policy like the SSPP
to have its desired impact. Nevertheless, the SSPP has had some successes. In
particular, this policy has reduced the gender-wage gap in the education and health
services sector, and it could be improved by putting in place a good managerial
quality in government agencies. A critical problem that needs to be also addressed
is the gap widening in the administration sub-sectors given this sub-sector plays a
major role in ensuring a smooth run of any economy. Also, our econometric analysis
of the effect of this policy has some challenges. For example, the availability of data
does not make it possible to measure the effect of the policy over a longer time period.
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Figure A.3: Monthly earnings (pooled
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2..1 Construction of Pseudo Panel











Table A.3: Year cohorts








Table A.4: Ethnic cohorts




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.6: Alternative measure of effort
Effort ≥ 40hrs/week Full Sample Male Female
Public Sector 0.0692 -0.149 -0.019
(0.151) (0.217) (0.215)
Public X Policy -0.109 -0.200 -0.011
(0.157) (0.223) (0.220)
Constant 0.039 -0.095 0.217
(0.163) (0.226) (0.254)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24639 13,774 10,865











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Kleibergen-Paap statistic 10.918 0.001
Stock-Yogo critical values
5% maximal IV relative bias 16.38
10% maximal IV relative bias 8.96
20% maximal IV relative bias 6.66
30% maximal IV relative bias 5.53
Note: The IV is the presence of a trade union at the work place in the public sector.
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Oil Extraction and Spillover
Effects into Local Labour Market:
Evidence from Ghana
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This paper investigates the effects of oil extraction on local labour market and
migration into areas close to oil deposits in Ghana. Most empirical studies on this
topic have focused on developed economies using aggregated state or country level
data. Using household level data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey, we employ
a difference-in-differences technique to show that oil extraction has positive spillover
effects on both income in non-oil sectors and migration into areas close to oil deposits,
but a negative impact on employment. The magnitude of the effects decreases for
income and migration and increases for employment, in districts further away from
the oil extraction area. The positive effect on income is largely observed for men and
workers in both the agricultural and retail sectors. The migration effect, on the other
hand, is mostly for women and workers in the retail and other services sectors.
Key words: Oil extraction; Spillover effects; Employment; Resource booms;
Migration; DID estimation.
JEL classification: O13, O15, Q32, Q33, R11, R23.
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3.1 Introduction
A natural resource boom can have both direct and indirect effects on labour markets
in resource and non-resource sectors. The indirect effects are usually termed spillovers
(see Marchand & Weber 2017). Much of the existing literature on natural resources
have focused on quantifying the direct effect resources have on economic growth and
development at the macro-economic level using aggregate data (Sachs & Warner 1995,
Gylfason 2001). These studies find a positive effect for developed economies and a
negative effect for developing economies. The conclusion is that resource endowments
alone are not enough to guarantee economic development. Combining them with
stable government, strong institutions and better infrastructure is vital for economic
growth and development. The absence of the aforementioned factors could explain the
so-called ‘natural resource curse’ phenomenon, i.e., countries that have not developed,
despite abundant natural resources; see Sachs & Warner (1995), Michaels (2011), and
Smith (2015).
A key limitation of the above studies is that the reliance on aggregate data masks
the source of changes in labour market activity resulting from a resource boom. For
example, an increase in employment documented using aggregate data can arise from
both within, and outside of, the resource sector. Spillover effects − which are the
effects one industry has on another industry, or on other segments of the economy −
are naturally ignored (Marchand & Weber 2017).
Natural resource spillovers using disaggregated data and analysis have been
increasingly popular as they provide more complete picture of the consequence of
resource endowments on the economy. The evidence of resource spillover effects,
however, varies in empirical studies. Black et al. (2005) examine the impact of coal
boom and bust in the US in the 1970s and 80s using county-level data and find a
positive spillover effect of coal on income and migration, but a negative effect on
employment. Brown (2014) analyses the effect of shale gas production in the US
on employment and income using county-level data and finds a moderate positive
spillover on employment in the manufacturing sector, and income in all sectors.
Fleming & Measham (2014) study the local job multipliers of mining in Australia
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using aggregate local government data and find no significant spillover on employment
in agriculture and manufacturing sectors.
Much of the extant evidence focus on developed economies and are largely
US-centric. Moreover, the aforementioned studies use aggregated state or regional
level data which makes it difficult to capture spillovers since they are largely
experienced among individuals in a district or region. In this paper, we take advantage
of a recent oil extraction in Ghana and the availability of detailed information on
individuals and their household characteristics, to examine oil spillover effects on
labour market circumstances in non-oil sectors. Specifically, we examine the following
outcomes: (1) income and employment in non-oil sectors, and (2) migration into
districts in the immediate proximity of oil extraction sites.
Ghana discovered one of the largest oil reserves in West Africa off the coast of
Western region in 2007 and started extraction in 2010. Using this extraction as
a potential exogenous shock to the oil sector, we employ difference-in-differences
estimation by assigning treatment status to individuals residing in the coastal districts
in the Western region of Ghana. These districts are in the immediate vicinity of the
area of oil extraction. We adopt a Synthetic Control Approach to select individuals
residing in other regions in Ghana as control group.
Our results indicate that there are significant spillover effects of oil extraction on
non-oil sectors. Specifically, we find positive spillover effects on income and migration,
but a negative effect on employment. The magnitude of the effects, however, varies
with proximity to the oil extraction area when treatment is extended to districts
further from the coast in the region. We further consider heterogeneity in the size of
the effects by both gender and sectors. In particular, the effect on income is larger
for males and for workers in the agricultural sector. The migration effect, on the
other hand, is observed for females, and among individuals working in the retail and
other services sectors. Although the overall employment spillover is negative, the oil
extraction effect on the manufacturing sector, where women make up the majority of
the labour force, is positive.
Our results also indicate that prior to oil extraction, income, employment and
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migration were not significantly different between the treated and control districts.
The identification strategy of the difference-in-differences relies on the assumption
that any difference in our outcomes are attributable only to the new oil extraction.
We show that the spillover effects of oil extraction on our outcome variables are
identified only for individuals at immediate coastal districts of the Western region,
as we use as control group, other regions in Ghana. However, a potential source of
bias arises from not having controlled for unobserved individual heterogeneity. To
address this, we use the approach proposed by Oster (2017) to show that the included
covariates in our regressions are informative enough in explaining the spillover effects
of oil extraction. Hence any potential bias due to omitted and confounding factors is
minimal.
The study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we suggest an empirical
identification strategy for measuring the impact of natural resources extraction at
a disaggregated level. Earlier studies that employ difference-in-differences strategy
select as control groups, individuals or districts further away from the natural resource
sites (Black et al. 2005, Kotsadam & Tolonen 2016). The challenge is that the
chosen control group may not be the most similar to the treated group which has
the potential of influencing the estimates. This study uses a Synthetic Control
Approach in selecting comparable individuals into a control group before adopting a
difference-in-differences strategy. This approach reduces the mean squared errors in
having a comparable group to the treated sample.
Second, earlier research on the topic in developing countries use aggregated
regional or district level data (see e.g. Caselli & Michaels 2013, Aragón & Rud
2013, Loayza & Rigolini 2016). By contrast, our study uses individual household
level data, thus allowing for more heterogeneous variations in the sample. A recent
study on Sub - Saharan Africa is from Mamo et al. (2019) who, using nightlight
density at district and regional level, examine the spillover effects of mine discovery,
and find no evidence. A closely related study is Kotsadam & Tolonen (2016) who
combine household level data with information on mines at the district level, and
find the opening and closing of mines impact women employment in Sub - Saharan
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Africa. The study finds little to no effect of mines on women employment in the
manufacturing sector. This finding is contrary to our study and shows that different
natural resources can bring about different impact on individuals in an economy
(Marchand & Weber 2017).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a background
to the Ghanaian economy and gains from the oil extraction and the data used in
the study. Section 3.3 discusses the identification strategy adopted. Sections 3.4 and
3.5 present the results and their robustness. Sections 3.6 and 3.7 detail the causal
mechanism and discuss the results. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Background and Data
3.2.1 Oil Production in Ghana
The Government of Ghana in 2004 sold licences to foreign oil extracting companies to
explore and produce oil offshore of Ghana. These companies discovered oil reserves
at Cape Three Points, off the coast of Western Region in 2007. The area was named
Jubilee Fields and was estimated to have between 600 million and 1.8 billion barrels
of oil, making it one of the largest oil reserve discovered in West Africa (Ayelazuno
2014). Extraction and production started in 2010 and it was found that the oil
from the Jubilee Fields commanded competitive prices in the world market given its
unusually light and sweet characteristics (Ayelazuno 2014).1 As shown in Figure 3.1,
production of crude oil increased significantly from an average of 10,000 barrels per
day prior to 2010 to an average of 78,000 barrels per day from 2011 to 2013.
The discovery of oil contributed significantly to oil rents, and GDP growth in
Ghana (Figure B.1 in the appendix). GDP growth increased considerably after 2010,
to an average of 9.6 percent between 2010-2013 from an average of 6.5 percent in
2006-2009. This led the World Bank to reclassify Ghana as a lower middle income
1An American Petroleum Institute, API Gravity is a measure of petroleum heaviness. Oil with
an API of more than 10 is considered lighter than water. Another measure of petroleum quality is
its sulphur content. Oil with sulphur content of less than 0.5 weight percent (wt%) is considered
sweet (Demirbas et al. 2015). Ghana’s oil has an API Gravity of 37.6 degrees and sulphur content
of 0.25 wt%
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economy in 2011 (World Bank 2011). Oil production also boosted the level of
economic activity.
Figure 3.2 depicts nightlight luminosity − the amount of man-made light observed
from space at night that is often used as a proxy of economic activity. We observe
that from 2010 to 2013, there is a rise in luminosity in the Western regions compared
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(b) Nightlight luminosity in 2013
Notes: Figures (a) and (b) plot the nightlight variations for Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Area in the Western
region for the years 2000 and 2013.
with other districts as depicted in the regional capitals.2
Figure 3.3 presents the intensity of nightlight in the Sekondi-Takoradi
Metropolitan Area. Figure 3.3a shows that prior to the new oil extraction, the
intensity was largely at Sekondi-Takoradi. The luminosity in the north and south
of the area increased in 2013 indicating a high level of economic activity as shown in
Figure 3.3b.
3.2.2 Data
We use data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) Rounds 4, 5 and 6
conducted in 1998, 2006 and 2013 respectively. This is a nationally representative
survey and one of the largest repeated cross-section data collection in Ghana. The
1998 round surveyed 5,998 households and the 2006 and 2013 rounds surveyed
8,687 and 16,772 households respectively (Ghana Statistical Service 2016). The
2The capitals of the regions (in brackets) are as follows Sekondi-Takoradi (Western), Accra
(Greater Accra), Koforidua (Eastern), Sunyani (Brong Ahafo), Tamale (Northern) and Wa (Upper
West).
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survey collects detailed information on demographic (gender, age, ethnicity) and
socio-economic (education, income, employment) variables of the households and its
members. We use individuals in the households as the unit of observation. Our key
outcome variables of interest are monthly income, employment and migration status.
We use monthly income that is derived from the primary job of workers. We do not
include income from secondary jobs given the number of missing observations in the
data. We follow the convention in the literature and use the logarithm of monthly
income. The employment variable is a binary indicator for individuals who have
done work for pay during the last 7 days. The migration variable is an indicator
of whether individuals were living elsewhere previously and have migrated into their
current locality.3 The remaining control variables are gender, age, marital status,
ethnicity, own education (in years), parents’ education (in years) and household head
status.
The lowest administration level in Ghana is the district. These districts make
up a region. The GLSS is carried out at the district level in all 10 regions of
Ghana as shown in Figure 3.4. The regions differ in their economic environment and
ethnic composition. Northern Ghana which comprises of Upper East, Upper West
and Northern regions; is considered the most deprived part of Ghana, with huge
differences in the level and standard of living compared to the south (World Bank
2011, Ghana Statistical Service 2016). Southern Ghana is seen as the most vibrant
and developed even before the discovery and extraction of oil. The oil extraction is
about 60 kilometres off the coast of the Western region and 225.3 kilometres from
the nation’s capital, Accra. Figures 3.4 & 3.5 show the regions in Ghana and the
oil extraction area respectively. Our empirical strategy involves examining the effect
of oil extraction with districts in closer proximity to areas with oil, compared with
districts further away. This is implemented in a difference-in-differences framework
which we will elaborate further in Section 3.3.
To this end, we use districts in the immediate coast of Western region as treated
3The income variable is a response to the question ‘What is the amount received for the work
done?’, Employment is to the question ‘Did (NAME) do any work for pay during the last 7 days?’
and Migration is to the question ‘Where was (NAME) living previously?’ The frequency (daily,
weekly, monthly, yearly) at which the income is paid is also reported.
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group.4 The challenge, however, is in choosing comparable control group for the
treated sample. To do this, we compare economic indicators (average of sources of
household income, proportion of migrants, household size and proportion of educated
adults.) from the GLSS survey reports of all regions in Ghana which are shown in
Table B.1 in the Appendix. The indicators show that Eastern, Greater Accra, Ashanti
and Volta regions are similar to the Western region. To do away with arbitrariness
in choosing comparable controls, we use the Synthetic Control Approach (SCA),
following Abadie et al. (2010), to select the most appropriate control group. The
technique uses a data-driven approach to reduce the mean squared errors in selecting
a comparable control group, by estimating weights for each region using the indicators
in Table B.1. The region with the highest estimated weight is the most comparable
to the Western region. The SCA requires panel data, which is not feasible using a
cross-sectional survey like the Ghanaian Living Standard Survey. We, therefore, use
the GLSS survey to estimate the weights for the regions, and apply these weights to
individuals in the survey.5
Table 3.1 presents the estimated weights, using SCA, for regions in Ghana that
are comparable to the Western region. The table shows that the Eastern region is
the most comparable given the large estimated weight. This is followed by Ashanti,
Brong Ahafo, Volta and Greater Accra regions.
Based on this result, we use individuals in Eastern region as control group. In
addition, we include individuals in Greater Accra in the control group for the reason
that the national capital, Accra, is located in the region. The other reason is that
the Greater Accra region is home to the national capital and other developed areas
in Ghana. As a robustness check, we use individuals in other regions as controls. To
test for the absence of confounding factors, we conduct a balancing and parallel trend
tests and report these in Section 3.3.2. A descriptive summary of the variables used
for the treated and control sample is presented in Table B.2 in the Appendix.
4We use immediate coastal districts —Jomoro, Ellembelle, Nzema East, Ahanta West,
Sekondi-Takoradi,Tarkwa Nsuaem, Shama, Wassa East and Mpohor— in the Western region as
treated group and all districts in Eastern and Greater Accra regions as control group.
5See Abadie et al. (2010), Cheong et al. (2017) for estimation of the synthetic control approach.
Stata user-written command Synth is used in estimating Synthetic Controls
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Figure 3.5: Location of oil extraction area
Source: Eni S.p.A (2015)
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Note Weights are computed using Synthetic
Control Approach of Abadie et al. (2010).
These weights are assigned based on the
socio - economic indicators in the reports of
the 1998, 2006 and 2013 GLSS survey.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Specification
Our objective is to identify any spillover effects on income, employment and migration
in the immediate coastal districts in the Western region. To do so in non-oil sectors,
we employ a difference-in-differences regression with the following specification
Yihr = β0 +β1PostOilt +β2Distihr +β3Distihr×PostOilt + γcXihr + at + εihr, (3.1)
where Yihr is the outcome variable — log of monthly income, dummy for employment
or migration status — of individual i in household h in district r. PostOilt
equals 1 for the period after oil extraction (2013) and 0 otherwise (1998 and
2006). Distihr equals 1 for the treated districts (immediate coastal districts) in
the Western region and 0 otherwise (districts in Eastern and Greater Accra regions).
Distihr×PostOilt is the key variable and β3 the key coefficient of interest; it captures
the difference-in-differences estimate or spillover effect of oil extraction in the treated
districts. Xihr is a set of covariates, Gender, age, years of education, as well as
size household, of individual i that may explain the variation in the outcome with
coefficient vector, γc. at is the time (survey year) fixed effects and εihr is the usual
error term.
The identification of the spillover estimates is conditional on controlling for district
76
fixed effects. This unobserved factor captures any differences in the outcome variables
that are a result of, for instance, local government administration projects across the
survey period. The inclusion of individual and household characteristics capture any
factors that may influence the outcome variables. Gender, age and years of education,
as well as size of the household may determine an individual’s decision to work and
not move away from a particular district. Furthermore, the inclusion of survey year
fixed effects also captures year-specific trends that could impact the outcome variables
during the time period analysed. These year fixed effects would account for other
government policies that were introduced to boost economic growth alongside the
discovery of oil, thus also affecting the outcomes we study. Not accounting for these
factors may wrongly attribute any changes to the new oil boom.
The timing of the 3 surveys is essential for our analysis, given that there are two
periods before (1998, 2006) and one period after oil extraction (2013). Thus, we have
three (3) years post oil extraction, giving room for the possibility of measuring any
effect from the extraction. In our sample, we include all members in the household
beyond 15 years in the model estimation.6 Standard errors are clustered at the district
level.
3.3.2 Threats to Identification
In equation (3.1), the spillover effect of oil extraction on the outcome variables,
captured by β3, represents the difference in log of monthly income, employment or
migration between the treated and control districts, before and after oil extraction
began. The identifying assumption is that changes in the outcome variables in both
the treatment and control districts are same prior to or in the absence of oil extraction.
To maximise comparability in the treated and control sample, we first conduct
a balancing test between treatment and control groups in the pre-extraction period.
Table 3.2 shows the difference of the average of the outcome and covariates between
the treated and control districts. The mean logarithm of monthly income of
respondents in the control district is higher than those in the treated district, but
6Household members under or aged 15 are excluded as the International Labour Law postulates
that working at age below 15 years of age is considered as child labour.
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Table 3.2: Balancing test
Districts
Variables Total Treated Control Diff P-value
Log of Monthly Income 4.082 3.853 4.091 0.238 0.169
(0.035) (0.155) (0.035) (0.173)
Employment 0.385 0.418 0.383 0.034 0.540
(0.015) (0.056) (0.016) (0.057)
Migration 0.616 0.696 0.610 0.086 0.123
(0.015) (0.052) (0.016) (0.057)
Age 40.551 39.867 40.591 0.725 0.492
(0.243) (0.988) (0.251) (1.055)
Age Squared/100 17.862 17.202 17.901 0.699 0.464
(0.220) (0.857) (0.228) (0.955)
Married 0.692 0.741 0.689 0.051 0.212
(0.009) (0.038) (0.009) (0.041)
Male Workers 0.718 0.756 0.716 0.039 0.324
(0.009) (0.037) (0.009) (0.039)
Own Years of education 8.999 8.207 9.046 0.838 0.103
(0.065) (0.227) (0.067) (0.879)
Father’s Years of education 8.235 8.054 8.243 0.189 0.611
(0.074) (0.291) (0.077) (0.273)
Mother’s Years of education 7.035 6.642 7.052 0.409 0.123
(0.053) (0.166) (0.055) (0.265)
Head of Household 0.934 0.948 0.933 0.015 0.484
(0.005) (0.019) (0.005) (0.022)
Observations 2,820 561 2,259
Note The treated group comprises of districts in the coastal regions in the Western region of Ghana which are in
the immediate vicinity of the oil fields. The control group are districts in the Eastern and Greater Accra regions.
The standard errors are in parentheses. P-value is for a test of the difference (Diff) between two means
the difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, on average, employment and
migration are higher in the treated district but not statistically different from that
in the control districts. Means of the covariates also show that respondents in the
control districts are older and highly educated than those in the treated districts,
though the differences between the two groups are not statistically significant.
To test the identifying assumption and rule out the possibility that the economic
situation is changing for regions in the treatment group compared to the control group
prior to the discovery of oil, we conduct a parallel trend test, following Muralidharan
& Prakash (2017) and present the results in Table 3.3. We interact an indicator for
2006 with the treatment districts and include this as a regressor, along with the full set
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of covariates, on the outcomes we study. Our results show that income, employment
and migration are not changing at different rates prior to 2010, hence supporting our
parallel trends assumption.
Table 3.3: Parallel trend assumption test
(1) (2)
Income Employment Migration Income Employment Migration
District × Post Oil2006 -0.178 0.009 0.295 -0.219 -0.009 0.241
(0.259) (0.064) (0.104) (0.344) (0.035) (0.151)
District × Post Oil2006 X Male -0.339 -0.023 0.070
(0.308) (0.015) (0.075)
Adjusted R2 0.411 0.522 0.157 0.325 0.514 0.154
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,759 2,759 2,759 2,644 2,644 2,644
Note: The year 2006 is considered as period after oil discovery and extraction.The regressions include full
set of covariates; demographic and socio-economic controls. Bootstrapped Standard errors clustered at the
district level in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
We also use individuals in different districts in other regions as treated and control
groups to investigate any possible economic shock other than the oil extraction.
Importantly, we use individuals in districts assigned weights by the Synthetic Control
Approach and present the results in Section 3.5.2. This is of particular importance
as the shocks that may have contributed to the rising economic growth in Ghana
could have also explained the differences in outcomes between the treated and control
districts, thus confounding the spillover effects of oil extraction.
The identification of the spillover effect on migration is based on the assumption
that migrants are from districts, other than the control group. Although this
assumption may not hold generally, the GLSS report on the sixth round show that out
of the 11 percent of respondents in the Western region that were reported as migrants,
only 0.8 percent migrated from the Greater Accra region (Ghana Statistical Service
2016). As such, migration from the largest control group is very low and should not
significantly affect our identification strategy.
3.4 Results
In this section, we first present the full sample estimates of the spillover effects of
oil extraction on income, employment and migration at immediate coastal districts
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(Section 3.4.1). We then examine how these effects vary across gender, sectors and
geographic proximity to the treated districts (Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Spillover Effects of Oil extraction
Table 3.4 presents the estimated spillover effects of oil extraction on outcomes of
individuals in the immediate coastal districts. For each outcome variable, the columns
report the difference-in-differences estimates when different set of covariates are
used. Column (1) reports the model with no covariates, columns (2)-(4) present the
estimates after accounting for demographic and socio-economic factors, while column
(5) shows the estimates with the full set of covariates. We will refer to column (5) as
controlled baseline effect.
Table 3.4: Spillover effect on income, employment and migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(I) Log of Monthly Income
Districts × Post Oil 0.673∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.135) (0.126) (0.117) (0.115)
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.406 0.482 0.492 0.518
Mean of monthly income 4.662 4.656 4.662 4.657 4.657
(II) Employment
Districts × Post Oil -0.014 -0.009 -0.030∗ -0.025∗ -0.028∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.016) (0.0140) (0.014)
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.112 0.162 0.169 0.170
Mean of employment 0.869 0.868 0.869 0.868 0.868
(III) Migration
Districts × Post Oil 0.088∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.140∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.085)
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.059 0.053 0.071 0.117
Mean of migration 0.477 0.478 0.478 0.479 0.479
Demographic controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Socioeconomic controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Regional level controls No No No No Yes
District level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,360 7,264 7,275 7,179 7,179
Note: The demographic controls include dummies for ethnic composition and marital status, whereas
socio-economic controls include age and square of age, parental completed years of education, own completed
years of education and dummy for household head status. Standard errors clustered at the district
level in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
The results for the main specification (see column (5)) show that oil extraction
has a positive effect on income and migration, and a negative effect on employment
(likelihood of being employed) in non-oil sectors. On average, incomes of non-oil
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sector workers in the treated districts increased by 0.50 percentage points as a result
of the oil extraction. This means that a standard deviation increase of being in the
treated districts (33 percent) leads to a 18.14 percent rise in income.7 Furthermore,
the new oil extraction has increased the likelihood of migration by 14 percent but
has marginally decreased the likelihood of employment by 2.8 percent. The higher
income spillover is expected given the boom and the rise in various economic activities.
The same observation holds for migration into these areas of intensified economic
activities. However, the overall negative effect on employment could be interpreted
as a result of higher production cost due partly to both micro and macro economic
factors like unstable electricity supply and inflation in the economy.
While we observe some minor differences in the difference-in-differences estimates
across the different specifications, the estimates are qualitatively similar. We also
obtained better goodness of fit and efficiency gains, viz-a-viz smaller standard errors,
in the models with covariates. As a robustness check, we examine the spillover effect
of oil extraction across the distribution of income following Firpo et al. (2009) As
presented in Table B.3 in the Appendix, we observe positive decreasing spillover
effects along the distribution of income with spillovers beyond the 75th quantile not
significantly different from zero.
The above results reflect the overall impact of oil extraction and may not reflect
the heterogeneity across gender and sectors. To explore this, we re-estimated model
(3.1) for males and females separately, for five disaggregated sectors: agriculture,
construction, manufacturing, retail, and services, and geographic proximity to the
coastal districts. Section 3.4.2 presents the details.
3.4.2 Gender, Sectoral and Proximity Variations
Table 3.5 shows the oil spillover effect on the outcome variables by gender. The
results show that the effect on income is positive and statistically significant for
males. For females, the estimated effect is positive but statistically insignificant. For
7We standardised the variable of interest, Districts×Post Oil (thus mean=0, variance=1) and
observe the effect of a standard deviation change on the outcome variable. A 33% increase in the
standard deviation leads to a 16.7% point increase in income which translates to 100[exp(0.1667)−
1]=18.4%
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the employment variable, the estimated effect for both males and females is negative
but not statistically different from zero. In contrast, the positive effect of migration
is statistically significant for females but not for males. As such, the overall positive
oil spillover effect on migration found in Table 3.4 seems to be due to females.
Table 3.5: Spillover effect of oil extraction by gender
Income Employment Migration
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Districts × Post Oil 0.684∗∗∗ 0.222 -0.011 -0.029 0.095 0.254∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.157) (0.016) (0.033) (0.088) (0.079)
Adjusted R2 0.533 0.496 0.136 0.268 0.120 0.115
Mean of Y 4.678 4.622 0.888 0.835 0.492 0.459
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,424 2,755 4,424 2,755 4,424 2,755
Note: Regressions include full set of covariates. Standard errors clustered at
the district level in parentheses. Regressions include full set of covariates. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
We further examine the spillover effect on migration at different age cohort for
both males and females. The results are presented in Figure B.2 in the appendix.
The graphs (dashed-blue for males and dotted-dark for females) show oil extraction
slightly increases the likelihood of males, under 45 years, to migrate compared with
the same female cohort. However, the effects reversed for cohorts beyond 45 years
up to 75 years, where females are now more likely to migrate than males. Note
however, that the effect are within the same confidence band (thus are not statistically
different) except at the upper tail of the age distribution where only the spillover effect
for females lies outside this confidence band of male cohort.
Table 3.6 shows the oil spillover effect across sectors. For workers in the
agricultural and retail sectors, the new oil extraction led to a positive and significant
increase in income but for construction, manufacturing and services sectors, the
estimates are positive but not significantly different from zero. The increased income
for agricultural workers is as expected since most coastal districts residents are farmers
and predominately fishermen.
That we find no spillover effect on income of manufacturing workers is unexpected
and raises the issue of the precision of the estimate. The difference-in-differences
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Table 3.6: Spillover effect of oil extraction across sectors
Agriculture Construction Manufacturing Retail Services
Log monthly income
Districts × Post Oil 0.887∗∗∗ 0.357 0.257 0.421∗∗∗ 0.165
(0.199) (0.217) (0.276) (0.161) (0.153)
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.736 0.518 0.494 0.551
Mean of monthly income 3.862 5.428 4.654 4.902 4.943
Employment
Districts × Post Oil -0.122∗∗∗ -0.058 0.126∗∗ -0.033 -0.049∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.269) (0.056) (0.038) (0.016)
Adjusted R2 0.263 0.268 0.180 0.495 0.035
Mean of employment 0.837 0.864 0.844 0.808 0.933
Migration
Districts × Post Oil -0.084 0.180 0.246∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.181∗
(0.120) (0.215) (0.096) (0.053) (0.097)
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.149 0.126 0.144 0.137
Mean of migration 0.571 0.495 0.470 0.469 0.428
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,708 301 945 1,581 2,635
Note: Regressions include full set of covariates. Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
estimate of the spillover effect on income in manufacturing is quite large (0.257) but its
estimated standard error is also large (0.276), thus rendering the estimate statistically
insignificant. There is a large variability in manufacturing workers’ income in the
treated districts, which is reflected in the difference-in-differences estimate of the oil
spillover effect.
Moreover, the probability of being employed is negative and significant in
agriculture and other services sectors but positive and significant in manufacturing
sectors. The higher likelihood of employment in the manufacturing sector after oil
expansion support our previous analysis that the insignificant oil spillover effect
on manufacturing workers’ income may be due to large standard error estimate.
Employment in manufacturing is boosted by the new oil expansion but the resulting
income vary largely across workers, making the average oil spillover effect on income
of manufacturing works statistically insignificant.8
Migrants are more likely to move into retail, manufacturing and other services
sectors, compared to both the agricultural and construction sectors. This could be
explained by the high education levels, skills and knowledge of most migrants moving
8The manufacturing sector includes small and medium scale businesses set up by self-employed
individuals.
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to take advantage of the opportunity in the treated districts.
Now, considering the geographic proximity to the treated districts, there is a
possibility that the spillover effect might not only impact individuals at immediate
coastal districts but extend further to individuals in other districts in the Western
region. For this reason, we extend treatment to individuals in all districts in the
region. Table B.4 in the Appendix presents the spillover effects of oil extraction
on our outcome variables in the Western region. We observe lower spillover effect
beyond the immediate coastal districts, irrespective of the gender or sector. The
signs, however, are in accordance with that of the estimates in Tables 3.4 & 3.6,
except for the income in districts farther away the coast where the sign seems to
be reversing. Most importantly, a test of differences within the Western region is
insignificant (see Table B.5) and solidifies our approach of using districts outside the
Western region as control group.
We analyze the above results further by considering heterogeneous effects among
our treated sample by re-estimating the model for different districts based on their
distance to the oil extraction area in Table 3.7. As stated earlier, the oil extraction
area is 60 km off the coast of Western region. For this reason, we re-estimate the
effect using district at the coast and an increment of 20 km upward up to 200 km.
Table 3.7: Oil spillover effect with distance (km)
Distance
60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Log of Monthly Income 0.960∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.392 0.351 -0.428∗
(0.277) (0.179) (0.149) (0.152) (0.174) (0.242) (0.262) (0.240)
Adjusted R2 0.526 0.531 0.532 0.521 0.529 0.524 0.524 0.522
Mean of monthly income 4.652 4.653 4.671 4.675 4.657 4.658 4.656 4.655
Employment -0.102∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.023∗ -0.013 0.010
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Adjusted R2 0.180 0.180 0.182 0.180 0.181 0.182 0.178 0.179
Mean of employment 0.874 0.873 0.875 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.872 0.871
Migration 0.410∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022)
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.105 0.127 0.103 0.111 0.105 0.100 0.108
Mean of migration 0.436 0.437 0.461 0.435 0.442 0.437 0.434 0.438
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5879 5844 6322 5805 5906 5839 5817 5841
Note: Distance is measured from oil extraction area. Standard errors clustered at the district level
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure 3.6 plots the spillover effects on the three outcomes. The mean estimates
(blue dotted line) show a higher effect at districts that are 60 km from the extraction
area. The effects tend towards zero as proximity increases and become insignificant for
income and employment. Moreover, we find higher effects for income and migration
than the baseline (black solid line), and lower negative effect for employment than
the baseline estimate.
Given the national capital, Accra, is included in the control group (Greater Accra),
and the regional capital of the Western region (Sekondi-Takoradi) is included in
the treated districts, we examine the spillover effect on the outcome variables at
the regional capitals of these regions. The reason being that Accra is home to
various economic activities and more developed, which is observed in the trend in
nightlight luminosity (See Figure 4.1). Examining the spillover effect at the major
cities will inform about various developments in the capital. We hereby conduct
a sub-sample analysis by assigning treatment to Sekondi-Takoradi which is the oil
city and use Accra, the capital city, as control districts. Using model (3.1), these
difference-in-differences estimates are presented in Table 3.8. The results show
that the spillover effects on income and migration were high and significant in the
regional capital of the treated district (Sekondi-Takoradi). Section 3.5 presents other
robustness checks.
3.5 Robustness Checks
3.5.1 Accounting for Omitted Variable Bias
The identification of the estimated spillover effects on our outcome variables above,
is based on the difference-in-differences strategy with the inclusion of a number
of covariates. However, there is a possibility that the covariates included in the
estimation may not be sufficient in capturing unobserved individual heterogeneity
in the sample. If so, this will result in biased estimate of the oil spillover effect.
Econometric techniques have been developed in recent years (see e.g. Oster 2017)
to evaluate the importance of these confounding factors. To assess the robustness of
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Table 3.8: Oil effect at regional capitals
Income Employment Migration
Panel A
Sekondi-Takoradi × Post Oil 1.222∗∗ -0.032 0.291∗∗∗
(0.559) (0.068) (0.101)
Adjusted R2 0.522 0.174 0.086
Mean of Y 4.888 0.874 0.301
Panel B
Sekondi-Takoradi × Post Oil 0.831 0.001 0.283∗∗
(0.604) (0.085) (0.133)
Sekondi-Takoradi × Post Oil × Male 0.579∗ -0.049 0.013
(0.320) (0.081) (0.119)
Adjusted R2 0.522 0.173 0.085
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,955 1,955 1,955
Note: Sekondi-Takoradi is the capital city of the Western region. Control group is Accra which is regional
and national capital of Greater Accra and Ghana. Bootstrapped Standard errors clustered at the district
level in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
our estimates to omitted variable bias, we follow the methodology of Oster (2017).
This approach makes full adjustment to the estimates after the inclusion of controls
by exploiting the movements and changes in the coefficients and the R-square of the
model to compute bounding values for the spillover effect.9
The results are presented in Table 3.9. We observe that the degree of
proportionality of observed to unobserved variables in the model is less than 1 (i.e.
δ̂ < 1) in all models, indicating a smaller importance of unobservables in influencing
the outcome variables after including the covariates. For each outcome variable, the
bias-corrected spillover effects, β̃, is fairly similar in magnitude to the controlled
baseline effects, β̂. This suggests that the included covariates have sufficient
explanatory power to balance any potential bias due to unobserved confounding
factors. As such, there is no evidence in support of omitted variable bias in our
regressions.
9See Oster (2017) on computation of the bias-corrected estimates. Stata user-written command
PSACALC is used in estimating biased corrected estimates.
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Table 3.9: Omitted variable bias correction
Outcomes Baseline effect, β̇3 Controlled effect, β̂3 Delta, δ Corrected effect, β̃3
(S.E), [Ṙ] (S.E), [R̂]
Log Monthly income 0.673 0.499 0.1748 0.437
(0.141)[0.393] (0.115)[0.518]
Employment -0.014 -0.028 -0.0276 -0.020
(0.030)[0.106] (0.014)[0.170]
Migration 0.088 0.140 0.0315 0.125
(0.029)[0.040] (0.029)[0.117]
Note: Results on baseline effect are from OLS regressions with no controls whereas results from
controlled effects are OLS regression with controls. Delta,δ is computed by following Oster (2017) and
it indicates how important observables are to unobservables. If δ = 1 it shows unobservables are
equally as important as observables whereas if δ > 1 it indicates unobservables are more important than
observables. Corrected effect is accounting for the Omitted Variable Bias in the model. R2 values
are from OLS regressions of these two models and standard errors are clustered at the district level.
3.5.2 Alternative definition of Treated and Control districts
As stated earlier, the choice of control group is based on the similarity in
characteristics between the districts in Eastern & Greater Accra and the Western
region as chosen by the Synthetic Control Approach. However, the Western region
may also be similar to other regions in southern Ghana based on characteristics– such
as co-ethnics, linguistic similarity, or other forms of economic activities. It is therefore
useful to examine the robustness of our spillover estimates to different control groups.
We use districts in Ashanti region as control group for the reason that residents
share similar language and majority in the region belong to the same ethnic group;
Akan (see Table B.6 in the Appendix).10 We also use districts in Volta region as
control group given they are on the coast and have similar economic activity; fishing,
comparable to residents in the coast of Western region. The expectation is that
significant oil spillover effects will still be identified even when different control groups
were assigned. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3.10. Overall, the
estimates are similar in sign and smaller in magnitude to the baseline estimates
(Table 3.4) indicating robustness of the findings.
To further examine the presence of economic shocks other than the new oil
extraction, we assign placebo (false) treatment to districts in Ashanti and Volta
regions keeping districts in Eastern and Greater Accra regions as the control group.
10See Easterly & Levine (1997) for the role of ethnicity in ensuring development.
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The estimates on the placebo test are shown in Panel B of Table 3.10. All estimates
are not significantly different from zero, thus validating the use of immediate coastal
districts as treated group and evidence of the presence of shocks other than the oil
extraction that would have biased the estimates.
It is worth mentioning that there is a rise in the outcomes of the placebo districts in
Ashanti region. This shows that income, employment and migration were increasing
during the period covered by this study, although these increases are not statistically
significant. We also use districts in Ashanti and Volta as “placebo” groups in addition
to the immediate districts in the Western region and examine a possible oil spillover
effects on the outcome variables. Panel B of Table 3.11 shows the results. A significant
spillover effects is observed on income and employment for the immediate coastal
districts in the Western region but no such evidence in the placebo treated districts.
We further examine the spillover effects by including as control group all
individuals in the regions assigned weights by the Synthetic Control Approach. We
examine the weighted spillovers and present this in Table 3.12. The estimates from
this approach is similar in sign as the baseline results indicating robustness of our


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Eastern Accra × Post Oil -0.243 -0.015 -0.077
(0.163) (0.034) (0.048)
Adjusted R2 0.508 0.201 0.072
Mean of Y 4.435 0.848 0.495
Observations 11,257 11,257 11,257
Panel B
Inclusion of placebo treatment
Income Employment Migration
Districts × Post Oil 0.395∗∗∗ -0.042∗ 0.122
(0.116) (0.023) (0.103)
Ashanti × Post Oil 0.194 -0.005 0.083
(0.177) (0.031) (0.054)
Volta × Post Oil 0.164 0.041 -0.024
(0.172) (0.032) (0.069)
Adjusted R2 0.500 0.193 0.076
Mean of Y 4.446 0.847 0.525
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,633 13,633 13,633
Note: In panel A, treated group is made up of residents in all districts in Eastern and Greater
Accra, and Control group is made up of residents in Ashanti and Volta. In Panel B, Control group
is districts in Eastern and Greater Accra regions. Standard errors clustered at the district level































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.6 Mechanism Explaining Oil Spillover Effects
The possible mechanism through which the oil spillover effects are observed can
be disentangled easily. Indeed, the possibility of increased households income and
migration come from the increased economic activity that is observed as a result of
the oil extraction off the Western region coast. Theory predicts that a natural resource
boom will lead to direct and indirect effects in the resource industry as well as other
industries in an economy. Our key findings that the extraction of oil in Ghana since
2010, has impacted positively on income and migration but negatively on employment
of workers in the immediate area of the extraction, could have some foundations in
that theory. To elucidate this, we use nightlight density in districts before and after
the new oil extraction as proxy for economic activity to explore the channel through
which these effects are transmitted. Table 3.13 presents the difference-in-differences
estimates using data from the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration
website, where the dependent is the log of mean nightlight density. Using the same
treated and control group as in the baseline model, we find an increase in the level
of nightlight density for the treated group (Table 3.13, column (1)). We extend
the treatment to all districts in the Western region but use the same control group
and find an increase but insignificant effects (Table 3.13, column (2)). We also use
all other districts in the 5 regions with estimated weights as control and the treated
sample in the baseline and find a statistically significant increase in nightlight density
for the treated districts (Table 3.13, column (3)).
Clearly, these results indicate an increased economic activity, which in turn led
to increased spillovers on income and migration. Although employment as a whole
was negatively affected, there was an increase in the number of workers in the retail
sector as expected given the informal nature of retail businesses in Ghana. Majority
of workers in this sector were reported to be migrants.
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Table 3.13: Nightlight variation in treated districts post oil extraction
log(nightlight+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Districts× Post Oil 0.096∗∗ 0.007 0.149∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.029) (0.036)
Mean of log(nightlight+1) 1.290 1.098 0.794
Observations 224 288 720
Districts 28 36 90
Regions 3 3 6
Year 8 8 8
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Column (1) includes treated and control districts same as baseline model, Column (2) extends to
all districts in the Western region but same control group. Column (3) includes all treated districts in
Column (1) and all other districts in the 5 regions assigned weight by SCA. Clustered standard errors at the
district level in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
3.7 Discussion of Results
The key findings in this paper are in line with earlier studies in the natural resource
literature. Michaels (2011) finds an increase in income in all sectors and employment
in the manufacturing sector for the southern part of the United States which is
known to be predominately an agrarian economy but endowed with oil. His study
attributes the increase in employment to an increase in unskilled labour (as some
sectors tend to cut down on cost by replacing highly skilled workers with unskilled
ones). Black et al. (2005) estimates the spillover effect of coal mining in the United
States and finds an increase in income for all sectors but no growth in employment
in other sectors. They have attributed the stagnant growth in employment to the
high income growth in those sectors (which makes it difficult for other job seekers
to penetrate the workforce). These findings indicate that natural resources do affect
local labour market outcomes. For developing economies, Mamo et al. (2019) find a
positive effect of mines discovery on the level of economic activity for Sub-Saharan
African economies but the absence of significant spillover effect. Kotsadam & Tolonen
(2016) examine the effect of mines discovery on women employment in Africa and
find women to move from agriculture sector to either the service sector or out of
employment. The understanding of the key findings in our study is that examining
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a natural resource spillover effect requires not only a micro level (household level
in our data), but also an appropriate econometric identification strategy suitable to
address the question at hand more accurately. In our case, a combination of the
use of individual level data, a difference-in-differences technique based on a control
group chosen by the Synthetic Control Approach and the distance from oil extraction
site has enabled us to disentangle the heterogeneous impact of oil spillover effects on
labour market outcomes in Ghana.
The heterogeneity in the spillover effect in our study is influenced by various
activities in the economy, some stemming from the operations of the oil extracting
companies and others from the macro economy. The rise in income gains for
agricultural workers with a reduction in employment indicate that these gains are
distributed to existing workers of this sector. However, the extraction of oil comes
with a negative externality; pollution. There are numerous concerns in the Ghanaian
media about contamination of water bodies from the activities of natural resource
extraction which makes it difficult for farmers.11 This externality resulted in raising
the cost of production for farmers, especially fish farmers in the region and has
a higher chance of even reducing the number of workers in the sector given the
increasing cost of inputs needed for farming activities. The role of extracting
industries causing pollution is well documented; see e.g. Aragón & Rud (2015) who
use the same data and find that gold mining in some communities in Ghana reduced
agricultural total factor productivity by 40%.
The fall in employment in the agriculture sector but rise in the manufacturing
sector may indicate as a move towards an innovative population in the economy.
The Ghanaian economy has been known to be largely agrarian in the past. With
a gradual shift towards self employment, there is a higher chance the economy will
move towards a more developed face with the extraction of oil. Another important
observation is the increasing number of females in the manufacturing sector. This
development seems to make for an inclusive development and growth for all. It is
however, important to add that with an insignificant effect on income of workers in
11See Deutsche Welle (2017).
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the manufacturing sector (if this were not due to high variability of income in the
sector), increasing numbers of workers into small scaled self-employment could have
a negative long term effect, with either workers being paid less than they deserve or
willing to accept a wage below what they are qualified for. The insignificant effect
in the manufacturing sector but significant effect in the retail could also indicate
consumers demand for imported goods with an increase in income, which would tend
to affect local production of goods by these manufacturing firms.12
However, the fall in employment in general may not be attributed to the
Dutch disease syndrome which is mostly associated with oil producing countries.
Surprisingly, the Ghanaian economy departs from the old known theory as data from
the central bank (Bank of Ghana) indicate a depreciating currency even with an
inflow of oil rent. This departure could be mainly as a result of increased demand
for imported goods. The inability of various sectors like the retail and other services
to employ a larger number stems from the increasing production cost from electricity
and other inputs needed. Until such challenges are addressed, the increasing number
of migrants into the Western region will add up to the rising unemployed population
in the country.
The positive and significant spillover effect of migration for women shows how
most women were empowered to venture into businesses. Table B.13 in the Appendix
shows majority of the women migrated from within the Western region and the
Upper East region. As mentioned earlier, the manufacturing sector includes small
and medium scale enterprises which are largely dominated by women. The new oil
boom made it possible for these women to undertake various economic activities.
Given that oil extraction is off-shore, we believe the magnitude of the spillover
effect will have been larger, especially for the construction sector if extraction was
on-shore. More importantly, with new discoveries of oil and gas fields in 2017 and
the implementation of the local content bill in 2014 which requires all foreign firms
to have a percentage of local workers, the government’s goal of ensuring the gains
are beneficial to all citizens should be realised. The expectation has seen people
12See WITS (2018) for more details.
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enrolled in training and skill development not only in oil but also in other sectors of
the economy (Obeng-Odoom 2013). Also, the local leadership of towns and cities in
the Western region plan to embark on a number of policies outlined in 2015 aimed at
improving the lives of residents in the region. This will play a major role in ensuring
a greater development for all residents in different sectors of the economy. However,
the existing extraction and new discoveries off the coast in the Western region set to
deepened the disparities between the south and north of Ghana. We believe these oil
shocks in the south could result in most residents in the north migrating southward.
To relate the study to existing theories, the findings in this study are in line
with the spillover theory which postulates that an expansion of a sector has a ripple
effect on other sectors of the economy. This theoretical foundation dates back to
Corden & Neary (1982) and Moretti (2010) who argue that the extraction of natural
resource will increase the demand for workers in upstream and downstream industries
associated with the natural resource industry and the income and or employment of
non-natural resource industries. Although our empirical evidence suggests an overall
fall in employment in non-resource sectors, there is an increase in employment in the
manufacturing sector (thus corroborating the theoretical prediction).
The study is also in line with the economic geography literature, that explains
how focused the spillover effects of the natural resources may be (see Vaughn 1994,
Fujita et al. 2001). A natural resource boom in a specific locality is sudden, significant
and has a possibility of affecting local market outcomes. The theory further explains
that the effects decrease with proximity from the natural resource location. We
find empirical evidence of this with higher spillover effect at immediate districts
and a decreasing effect further away from the extraction point. This, to an extent,
explains the reason why studies on aggregated economy might not always show the
heterogeneous spillover effects of natural resource in developing economies.
The study, however, is limited. With the available data, the spillover effects are
not as expected, for example the effects in the construction sector. The availability
of annual panel data from time of oil discovery to post extraction would have made it
possible to examine how individuals reacted to such information and how it affected
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various economic activities as can be seen in the movement of the night light radiance
over the years.
3.8 Conclusions
The study investigates the spillover effect of oil extraction on income and employment
of non-oil sector workers, and migration into areas close to oil deposits in Ghana.
The results show a positive spillover effect on income and migration but a negative
effect on employment. In addition, heterogeneous spillover effects are observed across
gender, sector of the residents, and proximity to the oil extraction area.
The findings suggests that examining a natural resource spillover effect requires
not only a micro level analysis, but also an appropriate econometric identification
strategy suitable to address the question accurately. We believe future work could
complement the limitations of study once data become available.
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Notes: Age cohort of males in dashed-blue and dotted-black for females. Confidence
band is for estimates for male age cohort.
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Monthly income 4.860 3.718 5.333
(1.739) (1.835) (1.457)
Employment 0.851 0.685 0.892
(0.356) (0.467) (0.312)
Migration 0.454 0.546 0.448
(0.499) (0.500) (0.499)
Age 36.30 38.35 35.49
(10.95) (11.72) (10.58)
Age2/100 14.37 16.07 13.71
(9.224) (10.47) (8.613)
Head of Household 0.758 0.889 0.695
(0.429) (0.316) (0.462)
Married 0.677 0.694 0.655
(0.469) (0.463) (0.476)
Education(yrs) 8.825 8.241 8.995
(3.028) (3.010) (3.012)
Father’s education(yrs) 5.052 6.389 4.325
(4.959) (3.533) (5.330)
Mother’s education(yrs) 3.636 5.787 2.665
(4.237) (3.079) (4.349)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.5: Within regional variation
Income Employment Migration
Districts× Post Oil 0.217 0.012 0.035
(0.329) (0.001) (0.099)
Post Oil 2.553∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗
(0.349) (0.044) (0.106)
Districts 0.058 -0.037 -0.099
(0.319) (0.035) (0.094)
Constant 0.586 -0.430∗∗∗ -0.293∗
(0.376) (0.067) (0.176)
Observations 1523 1523 1523
Adjusted R2 0.442 0.154 0.048
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: Control group is northern districts in Western region. Bootstrapped Standard errors clustered at the district














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.7: Proportion of workers
Male Female Total
Agriculture 4,737 1,339 6,076
Construction 629 113 742
Manufacturing 1,156 940 2,096
Retail Services 1,212 2,432 3,644
Other Services 2,271 3,928 6,199
Table B.8: Parallel trend assumption test
Income Employment Migration





Western 0.134 0.0164 -0.131
(0.166) (0.053) (0.095)
Constant 0.861∗∗∗ -0.0621 0.304∗
(0.329) (0.105) (0.082)
Observations 3143 3143 3143
Adjusted R2 0.371 0.537 0.142
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Socio-economic controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: The year 2006 is considered as period after oil discovery and extraction.
Bootstrapped Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses.***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table B.9: Spillover effect : Accounting for locality
Income Employment Migration
Districts ×Post Oil 0.457∗∗∗ -0.0401 0.163
(0.072) (0.039) (0.101)
Districts×Post Oil× Urban -0.282∗∗ -0.040∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.023) (0.049)
Districts 0.148 0.021 -0.191∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.044) (0.066)
Urban 0.407∗∗∗ 0.025 -0.075∗
(0.074) (0.017) (0.038)
Constant 0.310∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.086) (0.120)
Observations 5641 5641 5641
Adjusted R2 0.648 0.415 0.133
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.11: Using alternative definitions of treated and control districts
Income Employment Migration
Ashanti 0.227 0.022 -0.065
(0.187) (0.019) (0.039)
Ashanti × Post Oil 0.133 -0.002 0.114
(0.127) (0.032) (0.076)
Constant 0.414 0.143∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.046) (0.116)
Observations 5548 5548 5548
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Socio-economic controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: Ashanti region is the treated region and Volta the Control region.
Bootstrapped Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table B.12: Alternative control groups
Income Employment Migration
Baseline 0.499∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗ 0.14∗
(0.115) (0.014) (0.085)
Observations 7,179 7,179 7,179
Adjusted R2 0.518 0.170 0.117
Eastern× Post Oil 0.271 -0.115∗∗ -0.000
(0.164) (0.045) (0.125)
Observations 3891 3891 3891
Adjusted R2 0.575 0.508 0.021
Ashanti× Post Oil 0.187 -0.043∗ 0.044
(0.169) (0.022) (0.105)
Observations 4865 4865 4865
Adjusted R2 0.498 0.177 0.029
BrongAhafo× Post Oil 0.431∗ -0.148∗∗∗ 0.107
(0.217) (0.043) (0.151)
Observations 2926 2926 2926
Adjusted R2 0.541 0.558 0.136
Volta× Post Oil 0.163 -0.062∗∗ 0.184∗∗
(0.175) (0.029) (0.077)
Observations 3623 3623 3623
Adjusted R2 0.487 0.193 0.034
GreaterAccra× Post Oil 0.661∗∗∗ 0.064 0.347∗
(0.161) (0.083) (0.162)
Observations 4702 4702 4702
Adjusted R2 0.585 0.395 0.155
Note: Alternative control groups are designated in each row. These are used based on the weights assigned
to each region from the Synthetic Control Approach- Eastern, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Volta and Greater
Accra. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. Significant estimates are within the
95% confidence interval of the baseline model for income (0.319, 0.679), employment (-0.056, -0.000) and
migration ( -0.020, 0.300). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table B.13: Proportion of Origin of Migrants to treated districts
Sample Male Female
Ashanti 4.76 4.93 4.46
Brong Ahafo 0.91 1.11 0.56
Central 11.74 11.61 11.98
Eastern 1.52 1.75 1.11
Greater Accra 12.04 12.72 10.86
Northern 1.21 1.43 0.84
Upper East 24.90 23.69 27.02
Upper West 0.20 0.32 0.00
Volta 3.44 4.29 1.95
Western 39.27 38.16 41.23
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The extraction of natural resources can have social and economic impacts on residents
in a locality. Existing micro level studies examining natural resources impact, like
oil, have focused on developed economies and examine the impact at the means.
This paper examines the effect of oil extraction across the distribution of households’
expenditure in Ghana. Using household level data, we employ an unconditional
quantile difference-in-differences strategy to show that oil extraction has a positive
effect on low expenditure or poor households but negative effects for high expenditure
or rich households. Additionally, there are heterogeneous effects across household
expenditure share on food and non-food items, localities and gender. Results are
broadly consistent with theoretical predictions from standard microeconomics models.
Key words: Expenditure; Natural resources; Resource booms; DID estimation;
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4.1 Introduction
The effects of natural resources on the development of economies have been a topic
of interest for economists and public policy professionals since time immemorial and
extensively after the work of Sachs & Warner (1995). Existing empirical studies have
focused on the effect of resources, like oil, on macroeconomic outcomes, with most
studies finding a negative effect of the resource on growth and development in most
developing countries (Sachs & Warner 1995, Gylfason 2001, Papyrakis & Gerlagh
2004, Mehlum et al. 2006, Robinson et al. 2006).
Recently, there has been an increasing trend in the literature to examine specific
impact of the natural resource on the wellbeing for individual economies and regions.
Black et al. (2005) examine spillover effects of United States oil booms in the 1970s
and 80s using county level data, and find positive effect on income. Aragón &
Rud (2013) combine household and district level data to examine the effect of gold
mine’s demand on local input on real income, and find a positive effect on income
and on the supply market in neighbouring areas. On Africa, Kotsadam & Tolonen
(2016) examine effect of large-scale mining on employment for women in Africa, using
household and district level data. They find an increase in employment and income
for women living in mining districts. Mamo et al. (2019) find a positive effect of oil
discovery on the level of economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa using district level
night light data. The aforementioned studies and others in the literature, examine
the effect at either the county or region-level which hardly capture the impact on
individual or households. Additionally, studies examining household effects undertake
a partial analysis of the wellbeing with most focused on average estimation of crime,
income, employment and rate of education with no consideration for changes along the
distribution of these outcomes. For example, analysis of income informs how much an
individual, household or region earn from an activity related to the natural resource
extraction, either directly or indirectly. However, households have a tendency to
spend those earnings differently based on their position in the distribution which
could inform about how beneficial the resource has been for residents’ expenditure
on food and non-food items (Deaton 1997). Another shortfall is that income measures
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are not stable, making it difficult to use as a measure of wellbeing (Deaton & Zaidi
2002, Gillis et al. 2001, Meyer & Sullivan 2003). Using expenditure as a measure for
wellbeing gives a better estimate of addressing issues of the poor in most developing
economies, as it reflects the accumulation of assets especially in the presence of a
natural resource shock. The possibility of an increased economic activity as a result
of an oil boom may affect household spending differently along the distribution of
expenditure and this may impact their wellbeing.
In this paper, we examine the distributional impact of an offshore oil extraction
on the wellbeing of households using household level data from Ghana. The study
examines the extraction of oil along the distribution of household expenditure. In
2007, Ghana discovered the largest oil deposit in Sub-Saharan Africa off the coast of
Western region and began extraction in 2010 (Figure C.1a). Figure 4.1 shows a wide
spread of night light density -a proxy for economic activity- for Sekondi-Takoradi
Metropolitan Area, whose coast is about 60 km from the oil extraction site. Light
density was very much concentrated along the coast and the centre in 2000. We
observe a spread in light density to the north of the area in 2013. The study uses
households in districts closest to the extraction area as treated group and those
farther away (about 250 km) as control group. The identification of the oil extraction
effects is thus, by the proximity of households to the extraction site. The choice of
control group are, however, selected using the Synthetic Control Approach in order
to find comparable households to the treated sample. We then use an unconditional
quantile approach in a difference-in-differences framework to identify the impact. This
approach makes it possible to examine the distributional impact solely for households
in the treated districts by accounting for unobservable factors. The new oil extraction
serves as a potential source of exogenous variation between the treated and control
group and hence aids in identifying impact for the treated sample.
We find that the extraction of oil has a downward sloping impact on expenditure;
positive at low expenditure but negative at higher levels. This means that poor
households were positively impacted whereas the rich were negatively impacted.
We further find that this downward sloping effect is more evident for household
120


















(b) Nightlight density in 2013
Notes: Figures (a) and (b) plot the nightlight variations for Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Area in the Western
region and for the year 2000 and 2013.
expenditure share on food than non-food items. With an upward sloping impact for
household expenditure share on non-food items, we find rich households substituted
food purchase for non-food items and the poor, non-food for food items. These
findings are consistent with theories on a shock to expenditure.
With rising prices for household items in the wake of the oil extraction, we find a
fall in the real expenditure of poor households but an increase for those in the 90th
quantile, hence a decrease in the welfare of most households in the treated district.
There is a possibility that migration into the treated district from the control
group may contaminate our identification strategy especially when such migrants
positively select themselves. We observe a high level of migration into the Western
region of Ghana prior to the oil extraction (40 percent) but a reduction post extraction
period (7 percent). We, however, account for the birthplace of household head and the
duration of household stay in a specific district but find the estimates to be immune
to these inclusions. By including these variables, we account for sorting into our
treated districts which may not possibly be as a result of the new oil extraction. We
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further test for the absence of migration influencing the estimates by running a linear
probability model of household migration status within a difference-in-differences
framework.
While we attribute our difference-in-differences estimates to the proximity of
districts to oil extraction area, we test the possibility of other confounding factors.
We estimate our model with alternative control groups, thus districts in Ashanti
and Volta regions and find our results robust to these checks, hence validating our
identification strategy.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, the study contributes to the
literature by examining the distributional effect of oil shock which is hardly known
in the literature even for micro level studies on developed economies. Most studies
in the literature pay little attention to the heterogeneous impact and examine the
effect of natural resources at the mean; which may result in statistically insignificant
effect. A mean estimate of oil extraction impact for this study, even after accounting
for covariates, is an example of this situation. Our estimation technique following
Firpo et al. (2009) also makes it possible to account for a shift in the distribution
of the outcome variables and the explanatory variables. This makes it possible to
examine the impact not only by accounting for the within-group variation but also
between-group variation at each quantile.
Secondly, the study adds to the limited literature on the effects of natural
resources, specifically oil, to the development of an economy at the micro level,
especially developing economies. The growing literature is largely dominated by
studies on developed economies with a few studies on developing economies in Central
and South America. Most empirical studies on developing economies use aggregated
district or regional level data. This study, on the other hand, uses household level
data which allows for much heterogeneity in the sample.
The closest study to this paper is by Aragón & Rud (2013) who examine the
effect of a Peruvian gold mine expansion on residents in the mining locality. They
examine the effect of mine expansion on the demand for local input which they
believe affects the income, prices and expenditure of goods in the locality. Whereas
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the aforementioned study estimates the effect of gold mine at the mean, we use a novel
unconditional quantile approach and find varying impact of oil extraction along the
distribution of expenditure. This study is also different from Agyire-Tettey et al.
(2018) who examine welfare differences between rural and urban dwellers in Ghana
and focus on the changing pattern of welfare. Our study, however, examines the
wellbeing of households given a notable exogenous shock to expenditure.
Microeconomic theory, like the Engel Curve, suggests that households will reduce
their consumption of inferior goods to spend more on normal goods given an increase
in income (Engel 1857). The theory further adds that poor households will consume
more food items for a given increase in income. We find an alignment of these
predictions in our study given a positive impact of the oil extraction on poor
households’ consumption of food and rich households’ consumption of non-food items.
However, the study’s findings are not consistent with insights from the money
metric utility measure of welfare proposed by Blackorby & Donaldson (1988). The
theory assumes that households will choose a set of goods to maximise at a given
budget set and will prefer higher level of satisfaction for an increase in income. With
a rise in income and a higher rise in prices, a larger proportion of households fail to
reach a higher welfare level.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section, 4.2.1, gives a
brief background of oil production in Ghana. Section 4.2.2 describes the data used,
Section 4.3 details the empirical strategy and the identification strategy. Section 4.4
reports the results using the data and estimation technique. Section 4.5 presents
some robustness checks and finally Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Background and Data
4.2.1 Oil Production in Ghana
In 2004, the government of Ghana sold licences to foreign companies for offshore
oil exploration and production. These companies discovered oil deposit at the Cape
Three Points, located on the coast of the Western Region in 2007. Figures 4.2 and
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4.3 show the regions in Ghana and the oil extraction area. The area is about 60km
from the coast of the Western region and 285.3 kilometres from Accra, the national
capital. The area discovered was estimated to have oil reserves between 600 million
and 1.8 billion barrels, and with extraction beginning in 2010, the oil commanded
competitive price on the world market because of its unusual characteristics of being
light and sweet.1 (Kastning 2011, Ayelazuno 2014)
Oil production increased from as low as 10,000 barrels per day prior to 2010 to
an average of 78,000 barrels per day from 2011 to 2013 as shown in Figure C.1a.
The high production rate and gains from the oil increased the GDP of Ghana with a
growth from 6% on average prior to the extraction to 9% post extraction era. This
increased GDP growth was largely as a result of the oil rent which increased from
about 0.1% to about 5% as shown in Figure C.1b in the Appendix. Ghana was
reclassified as a middle income economy by the World Bank after these developments
(World Bank 2011).
The increased growth in the Ghanaian economy is evident not only in the GDP
but also in the level of economic activity undertaken at the micro level. Nightlight
density is the amount of man-made light emitted at night from space. It serves as a
proxy for economic activities that are undertaken in a locality (Henderson et al. 2012,
Mamo et al. 2019). With increased oil production, the density for Ghana increased
substantially among peers in West Africa post oil extraction. However, the increase
is mainly observed in the Western region districts closest to the oil extraction area,
with districts in Greater Accra, Ashanti and Eastern regions having relatively stable
radiance post oil extraction period as seen in the regional capitals of these regions in
Figure 4.4.2
1Ghana’s oil has an API Gravity of 37.6 degrees which is more than the benchmark of 10 and
hence considered lighter than water. It also has a sulphur content of 0.25 wt% which is less than
0.5 wt% and hence considered sweet (Demirbas et al. 2015).
2The regional captials (and their regions) are Sekondi-Takoradi (Western), Accra (Greater
Accra), Koforidua (Eastern), Sunyani (Brong Ahafo), Tamale (Northern) and Wa (Upper West).
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Figure 4.3: Location of oil extraction area
source:Eni S.p.A (2015)
4.2.2 Data
The study uses data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) rounds 4,
5 and 6 undertaken in 1998, 2006 and 2013 respectively. These are nationally
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The regional captials (and their regions) are Sekondi-Takoradi (Western), Accra
(Greater Accra), Koforidua (Eastern), Sunyani (Brong Ahafo), Tamale (Northern) and
Wa (Upper West).
representative cross-section surveys. 5,998 households were surveyed in the 4th round,
8,687 households in the 5th round and 16,772 in the 6th round. Each household was
asked about socio-economic characteristics of its members; age, years of education,
employment status, income and expenditure patterns of members as well as other
demographic factors. In this study, we consider the household as a unit of measure
and estimate the oil effect at the individual household level.
The outcome variable, households’ annual expenditure, is made up of expenses
made within a 12-month period on food and non-food items.3 With the shock of the
oil extraction, there is a possibility of an increase in economic activity and this has
the potential of increasing households purchasing behaviour. This behaviour may be
different for households on the expenditure distribution. Rich households may have
enough resources to undertake more economic activity which may lead to an increase
in their wealth. Poor households on the other hand, may spend a larger share of
their gains on their most immediate needs which largely are food items. The effect
on food and non-food expenditure are therefore, expected to be different along the
distribution of expenditure.
3Households responded to the question “During the past 12 months, how much did the household
spend on:”.
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The effect of prices has a potential impact on households’ expenditure. The trend
in prices increased significantly during the study period as shown in Figure C.2 in
the Appendix. We account for this by deflating the annual expenditure with annual
regional prices at the time of the survey. We refer to this variable as real expenditure
which is used as a proxy for welfare measure.4
4.2.3 Assignment of Treatment
The GLSS is carried out in the lowest administrative level; districts in Ghana. These
districts make up a region. There are 10 regions and each react differently to shocks.
Southern Ghana is more developed than the north and this is evident in the nightlight
density presented above.
The possibility of the oil extraction having an impact is dependent on the distance
households are from the oil extraction area. Given the coast of the Western region is
about 60 km from the extraction area, We use households in the immediate coastal
districts of the region as treated group. By this reasoning, households farther from
the Western region would be less affected by the oil extraction and would be used as
a control group. The difficulty lies in choosing the most appropriate control group
for the treated sample. One way is to compare characteristics among the 10 regions
and select the most appropriate control group. Table C.1 in the Appendix presents
some key indicators ( average of sources of household income, proportion of migrants,
household size and proportion of educated adults.) of households in the 10 regions
of Ghana as stated in the final reports of the 3 surveys used. The Western region
is similar in characteristics to the Eastern, Greater Accra, Ashanti and the Volta
regions. Selecting among these regions may seem arbitrary though they are farther
from the Western region. Hence, we adopt the Synthetic Control Approach by Abadie
et al. (2010) in selecting the most appropriate control group based on the indicators
in Table C.1. The technique uses a data-driven approach to minimize the error in
selecting comparable control groups, by estimating weights to each region to show
their comparability to the treated group. Region with highest weight is the most
4See Deaton & Zaidi (2002).
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comparable to the Western regions.5 Table 4.1 presents the weights of each region
and this shows that based on the indicators, Eastern region is the most comparable,
followed by Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Volta and Greater Accra. The 3 northern and
Central regions are assigned no weights showing their dissimilarity to the Western
region.











Note: Weights are computed using
Synthetic Control Approach of Abadie
et al. (2010). The estimated weights
are based on the socio - economic
indicators in the final GLSS reports
of the 1998, 2006 and 2013 survey.
Based on this approach, we use households in coastal districts in the Western
region as treated group and households in Eastern region as control group.6 We
include households in Greater Accra in the control group given it is home to the
national capital and it is the most developed region in Ghana. Moreover, we
undertake a parallel trend test with the sample in Section 4.5.1 and check the
robustness of our choice of control by using households in different regions as
alternative control group in Section 4.5.5.
A descriptive summary of the variables used in the study are presented in
Table C.3 in the Appendix. Table 4.2 presents the mean of log expenditure for
the treated and control sample. Rows (1) and (2) show higher average expenditure
levels for households in the control districts before and after the oil extraction. This
may reflect the high economic activities in the control group as shown in Figure 4.4.
5See Abadie et al. (2010), Cheong et al. (2017) for estimation of the synthetic control approach.
6Treated districts are —Jomoro, Ellembelle, Nzema East, Ahanta West,
Sekondi-Takoradi,Tarkwa Nsuaem, Shama, Wassa East and Mpohor— control includes all
districts in Eastern region and Greater Accra regions.
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However, the average expenditure increase is higher for households in the treated
districts as shown in Row (3) indicating a shock in the treated sample. A test of
difference, in Row (4), for the two means shows a statistically insignificant increase
in expenditure for the treated group.
Table 4.2: Expenditure means by treatment
Treated Control
Districts Districts
(1) Before oil extraction 6.726 6.821
(0.056) (0.111)
(2) After oil extraction 8.881 8.955
(0.079) (0.123)
(3) Rows [(2)-(1)] 2.155 2.134
( 0.097) (0.081)
(4) treated (3) - control(3) 0.021
(0.126)
Note: Estimates are means of treated and control districts. Standard
errors clustered at the district level in parentheses.
Additionally, we plot the kernel density of expenditure for our treated and control
groups and present them in Figure 4.5. The distribution for food and non-food items
share have been deferred to the Appendix. Figure 4.5 shows household expenditure is
widely spread but lesser for treated than control group before the oil extraction. There
is an increase in density and much convergence around the mean post oil extraction
period for the two samples. The distribution for the treated sample is near symmetry
and higher along sections of the distribution, indicating an uneven rise in household
expenditure. We also observe a switch at high density of log expenditure before
and after the oil extraction. In Figures C.3 and C.4, we observe the increase in the
density of household expenditure is from the distribution of food and the switch in
the average is as a result of changes in non-food expenditure.
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4.3 Empirical Strategy
Most empirical studies examine micro level natural resource effects at the average of
the outcome variable of interest, using an OLS regression or fixed effect model.7
Though these approaches result in consistent estimates provided all assumptions
are satisfied, they are not enough in capturing the marginal effects across entire
distribution of the outcome variable. The studies using these techniques may over or
under state the estimates.
Several econometric techniques have been developed to examine marginal effects
along a distribution of outcomes and the common ones are the conditional (Koenker
& Bassett Jr 1978, Koenker 2004, Machado & Mata 2005, Canay 2011) and
unconditional quantile regressions (Firpo 2007, Firpo et al. 2009, Powell 2016). The
underlying differences in the two approaches have to do with the computation and
interpretation of the marginal effect of the estimated coefficients. The conditional
quantile techniques are difficult to estimate and cannot be extended to account for
7See Black et al. (2005), Michaels (2010), Marchand (2012), Paredes et al. (2015), Buonanno et al. (2015), Jacobsen
& Parker (2016), Kumar (2017).
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changes or a shift in the location of explanatory variables on the outcomes (Firpo
et al. 2009). Thus, the approach by Koenker & Bassett Jr (1978) only accounts
for the within-group variation of the outcome variable conditional on the covariates.
The unconditional approach by Firpo et al. (2009) on the other hand estimates the
within-group and between-group effects, thus, it accounts for the distribution of the
outcome and explanatory variables.
We, therefore, use an unconditional quantile regression following Firpo et al.
(2009) in a difference-in-differences framework following Havnes & Mogstad (2015).
The approach adopts the Influence Function (IF) in estimating the unconditional
quantiles of the distribution of the outcome variable for a shift in location of an
explanatory variable. The Influence Function, which shows the influence a particular
observation has on the distributional statistic of the outcome variable, is stated as
IF (Y ; v, FY ) (4.1)
where Y is the outcome variable, v is any given statistic and FY is the distribution
of the outcome variable. Adding the distribution of the statistic, v(FY ), to the IF
gives the Recentered Influence Function (RIF). The key idea of RIF is to transform
the dependent variable and allow the coefficient on the variable of interest to recover
the effect of the natural resource on some aggregate statistic of the distribution of
the outcome variables.
Estimation of the quantile of our outcome variables is possible given the IF and
RIF of the forms;
IF (Y ; qτ , FY ) = (τ − 1 {Y ≤ qτ})/fY qτ (4.2)
RIF (Y ; qτ , FY ) = qτ + IF (Y ; qτ , FY ). (4.3)
where 1 {Y ≤ qτ} is an indicator that a value of the outcome variable is below the
quantile, τ . fY qτ is the marginal density of Y at the point qτ . The conditional
expectation of the RIF(Y; v, FY ) as a function of the covariates is the RIF regression
in equation (4.4). In the case of the unconditional quantile regression the equation
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will be (4.5).
E [RIF (Y ; v, FY )|X] = mv(X). (4.4)
E [RIF (Y ; τ, FY )|X] = mτ (X). (4.5)
To compute the unconditional quantile of the outcome variables, we first estimate
the sample quantile, qτ , an indicator for the quantile, 1 {Y ≤ qτ}, and the marginal
density at the point of the quantile, fY qτ , using kernel density estimator of the form
in equation (4.6) where b is a positive scalar bandwidth (Firpo et al. 2009).












We then estimate the new transformed outcome variable with a set of covariate by
OLS to derive the marginal effect of our variable of interest which provides consistent
estimates given Pr [Y > qτ |X = x] is linear in x.
Adopting this estimation approach, we examine the effect of oil extraction on
household expenditure by presenting our model as the following:
RIF (Yh, v(F )) = (Districtsh × PostOilt)′β +X ′hγ + dh + at + eh (4.7)
where RIF (Yh, v(F )) is the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) of a given statistic,
v of the outcome variables, Y ; log annual expenditure of household, h. Districtsh
and PostOilt are indicators for households residing in the treated districts and post
oil extraction period respectively. Districtsh captures the difference in the outcome
variables between treated and control districts over the sample period and PostOilt
shows the difference in the outcome variables before and after oil extraction. The
interaction term, therefore, captures the effect of oil extraction on the outcome
variables of the treated households. Xh is a vector of household demographic controls;
dummies for ethnic composition, marital status and religion of household head, and
socio-economic controls; household size, household heads’ age, square of age and
their completed years of education. dh and at account for the district and time fixed
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effects with eh capturing the idiosyncratic shocks. We follow the literature and use
the logarithm of the outcome variables in the sample and bootstrap the standard
errors with 500 replications.
The coefficient of interest, β, measures the impact of oil extraction on the
expenditure of households in the treated districts. The identification of our parameter
of interest is that changes in expenditure in the treated districts post 2010 are as
a result of the new oil extraction. This means that any difference in expenditure
between the treated and control districts prior to extraction should be same or
statistically insignificant. To aid identification, the study controls for some household
factors.
These household factors may influence expenditure other than the shock. The
age, years of education, household size and the marital status of the household head
has a higher possibility of affecting how much a given household may spend over a
period. Not accounting for these may result in a biased estimate of the oil extraction
effect.
The inclusion of district fixed effects also aids identification as they capture any
economic development that may influence the expenditure of households other than
the increased economic activity made possible by the extraction of oil in Ghana.
The year fixed effects on the other hand, account for any changes or decisions
impacted on the expenditure of households by actions of national or local
governments. Politicians in an attempt to win political power may embark on several
possible initiatives which could impact household wellbeing. Not accounting for these
factors may wrongly attribute their effects to the new oil boom.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Oil Effect on Household Expenditure
Table 4.3 presents the estimates based on equation (4.7) for two models - without
and with covariates. For comparison, we present the OLS results in addition to the
quantile estimates. The model without and with covariates are on upper and lower
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panels respectively. The upper model shows a positive and not statistically significant
impact of oil extraction, on average. Across quantiles, the effect is only significant at
the 75th quantile of the distribution. The model with covariates, on the other hand,
Table 4.3: Oil effect on household expenditure
Quantiles
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Household Expenditure
No Controls (N=13,801)
Districts × Post Oil 0.358 1.275 1.581 0.265 -0.201∗ -0.0402
(0.331) (1.702) (0.965) (0.175) (0.111) (0.0623)
Controls No No controls for all quantiles
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
With Controls (N=12,433 )
Districts × Post Oil -0.059 0.895∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.319) (0.057) (0.046) (0.048) (0.057)
Controls Yes Similar controls for all quantiles
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Note: The demographic controls include dummies for ethnic composition, marital status and
religion of household head, whereas socio-economic controls include household size, household
head’s age and square of age, completed years of education. Bootstrapped standard errors
with 500 replications in parentheses for quantiles. Clustered standard errors at the district
level for OLS.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
shows a negative and not statistically significant impact on average but a significant
impact across the distribution. There are positive and negative significant effects
below and beyond the 25th quantile. We find that oil extraction off the coast of the
Western region increased expenditure by a 0.9 percentage points for poor households’
in the treated district, thus households in the 10th quantile. A graphical presentation
of the oil extraction effects is shown in Figure 4.6. The y-axis of the figure indicates
the oil extraction effect and the x-axis shows the quantiles at which these effects are
estimated. The positive impact of the extraction is largely for households below the
20th quantile.
The insignificance of the average estimate shows the essence of employing a quantile
technique to examine oil extraction impact on household expenditure. Additionally,
the estimates from the unconditional quantile approach differs from the conditional
approach by Koenker & Bassett Jr (1978) which is presented in Table C.4 in the
Appendix. The former examines the impact by accounting for not only the within
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but also between variation in the distribution. Importantly, the estimates from the
Firpo et al. (2009) are unconditional. 8
We decompose the oil extraction impact by households’ expenditure share on food
and non-food items. Table 4.4 presents the difference-in-differences estimate of oil
extraction impact on expenditure share of food and non-food items. The impact
on food items is downward sloping but upward sloping for non-food items. These
results indicate that rich households increase their consumption of non-food items
more when there is a shock whereas poor households increase their consumption of
food items. The overall impact is therefore dominated by the expenditure on food
items.
Table 4.4: Oil effect on household food, non-food expenditure and real expenditure
Quantiles
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Food (N=12,433)
Districts × Post Oil -0.315∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ -0.0035 -0.451∗∗∗ -0.564∗∗∗ -0.555∗∗∗
(0.0293) (0.110) (0.7483) (0.0397) (0.0398) (0.0392)
Non-food (N=10,641)
Districts × Post Oil 0.0730 -0.467 0.0826 0.205∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.0884
(0.0955) (0.538) (0.129) (0.0581) (0.0562) (0.0745)
Real expenditure (N=12,433)
Districts × Post Oil -0.117 -0.463∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.135 1.332∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.051) (0.045) (0.048) (0.229) (0.273)
Controls Yes Similar controls for all quantiles
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses for quantiles. Clustered standard errors
at the district level for OLS. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
4.4.2 Oil Effect on Real Expenditure
Table 4.4 shows the oil effect after accounting for general price levels in regions.
Surprisingly, only treated households in higher quantiles, specifically beyond the 80th
quantile (see Figure 4.8), have a positive increase in real expenditure. This shows
that the increased income and for that matter increased expenditure on items of all
forms were purchased at a relatively higher price for poor households. Given rich
8Stata user-written command rifreg is used in estimating unconditional quantile estimates.
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households spent a higher share of their increased income on non-food items, we
observe that the increased food prices as shown in the Appendix ( Figure C.2), have
a higher effect on poor households’ welfare.9
4.4.3 Heterogeneous Effects
A. By gender
The extraction impact, though heterogeneous across quantiles, has the possibility
of varying by gender of household heads given differences in characteristics. For
this, we estimate oil effect separately for male and female household heads in the
treated district. Figure 4.6 shows the oil effect for the two sub-samples. We find
female household heads to be more affected by the oil extraction than males at lower
quantile of expenditure. The impact beyond the 20th quantile is higher for male heads
than female heads.
Decomposing the impact into expenditure share on food and non-food items shows
varying effects along the distribution with female household head being affected less
at lower quantiles and more at higher quantiles as shown in Figures 4.7b. Moreover,
the oil effect on expenditure share on non-food items is positive for male household
heads beyond the 15th quantile and only positive for female household heads below
this quantile as shown in Figure 4.7d. This means most female household heads are
burdened by the need to provide food for their households and have less to purchase
other items. However, the negative oil extraction effect on real expenditure is lower
for female household heads as shown in Figure 4.8b.
B. By localities
We estimate the impact separately for households living in rural and urban areas.
There is a possibility oil extraction impact may differ depending on the location
of a household in the treated districts. Majority of rural dwellers are farmers who
are net consumers of their produce hence will spend relatively less on food items
9There is a limitation in the available data, thus there is no data on price index for food
and non-food items, making it difficult to examine oil extraction effect on real food and non-food
expenditure
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compared to rural dwellers. Figure C.5 in the Appendix ascertains this reasoning
given a similar pattern of the oil impact on rural households expenditure share on
food items. However, there are no significant difference between rural and urban
dwellers with household expenditure share on non-food items, though the effect is
higher for rural households.
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4.5 Robustness Checks
4.5.1 Placebo Test
Identification of the oil extraction effect on the outcome variables rests on the
parallel trend assumption. We test this using the surveys (1998 and 2006) prior
to oil extraction. We use 2006 as a post-oil extraction year, interact it with our
treated district indicator and estimate the oil effect on the outcome variables. Our
expectation is that, with no oil, there should not be a significant difference between
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the treated and control districts or a significant difference but in same direction
as the estimate post oil extraction. Table 4.5 presents the results and shows a
Table 4.5: Parallel trend test
Quantiles
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Expenditure (N=3,150)
Districts X Post Oil2006 -0.061 -0.340 0.156 0.106 -0.099 -0.277
(0.054) (0.150) (0.132) (0.081) (0.082) (0.193)
Real exp (N=3,150)
Districts X Post Oil2006 0.034 0.081 0.140 0.106 0.079 -0.073
(0.052) (0.099) (0.085) (0.074) (0.071) (0.098)
Controls Yes Similar controls for all quantiles
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Note Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
statistically insignificant placebo effect on average and at various quantiles of the
outcome variables.
4.5.2 Intensive and Extensive Margins
We decompose the impact into extensive and intensive margin to find out whether
the effect is largely driven by immigrants or natives in the treated districts. We
examine 2 subsets of our sample; household that have stayed at most three (3) years
and those stayed over three (3) years in a district. This decomposition is based on
the fact that the post oil extraction survey is taken after 3 years. The estimates,
presented in Table 4.6 show that households with at most three (3) years stay in the
treated district had a less oil extraction impact on their expenditure than households
with over 3 years stay. This shows that native households in the treated sample were
largely affected than immigrants.
4.5.3 Accounting for Omitted Variables Bias
The omission of an important variable can affect the results. For example, the
expenditure of households might depend on the industry in which the household
head belong. Household head in agriculture sector may tend to spend differently
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Table 4.6: Intensive and extensive margins of oil extraction impact
Quantiles
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Expenditure
Baseline (N=12,433)
Districts×Post Oil -0.059 0.895∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.319) (0.057) (0.046) (0.048) (0.057)
Stayed over 3 years (N= 11,316)
Districts×Post Oil -0.033 0.372 0.146 -0.082∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.251) (0.089) (0.038) (0.039) (0.046)
Stayed within 3 years (N=774)
Districts×Post Oil -0.103 1.361 0.002 -0.358∗∗ -0.511∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗
(0.131) (0.940) (0.272) (0.146) (0.165) (0.202)
Real expenditure
Baseline (N=12,433)
Districts×Post Oil -0.117 -0.463∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.135 1.332∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.051) (0.045) (0.048) (0.229) (0.273)
Stayed over 3 years (N= 11,316)
Districts×Post Oil -0.208∗ -0.314∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗ -0.471∗∗ 0.401∗∗
(0.103) (0.0464) (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.198) (0.181)
Stayed within 3 years (N=774)
Districts×Post Oil -0.263∗∗ -0.459∗∗ -0.292∗ -0.403∗∗ 0.672∗∗ -0.0633
(0.0950) (0.190) (0.155) (0.176) (0.320) (0.688)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Controls Yes Similar controls for all quantiles
Note: Each model includes each of the specified variable in addition to the baseline model. Stay
length is the duration for which the household have been living in the district. We estimate separately
for households with more than 3 years length stay and those with only 3 years. Bootstrapped
standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses for quantiles. Clustered standard errors at the
district level for OLS. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
from those in education or health sectors. We account for the reported industry of
the household head and re-estimate our model. Table 4.7 presents the results and
shows similar pattern as the baseline model after accounting for the industry in which
the household head works.
Additionally, the place of birth of an individual may influence their expenditure
which may not necessarily be as a result of the oil extraction. Individuals born in an
area of relatively high living standard may spend more, and have the tendency to react
differently to shocks. We account for this variable in our model with the industry
control and re-estimate our equation. We find similar pattern as the baseline model
though with a slight change in the magnitude of the estimates as presented in Table
4.7. These robustness checks show that different shocks pick up relevant variation but
these are uncorrelated with variation across the distribution of our outcome variables
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from the oil extraction.
Table 4.7: Accounting for omitted variable bias
Quantiles
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Expenditure
Baseline (N=12,433)
Districts×Post Oil -0.059 0.895∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.319) (0.057) (0.046) (0.048) (0.057)
+Industry (N=12,433)
Districts×Post Oil -0.087 0.889∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.440∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.318) (0.058) (0.046) (0.048) (0.056)
++Birth place (N=12,433)
Districts×Post Oil -0.0317 0.395∗ 0.116 -0.101∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.240) (0.083) (0.036) (0.037) (0.044)
Real expenditure
Baseline (N=12,433)
Districts×Post Oil -0.117 -0.463∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.135 1.332∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.051) (0.045) (0.048) (0.229) (0.273)
+Industry (N=12,433)
Districts×Post Oil -0.149 -0.516∗∗∗ -0.604∗∗∗ -0.734∗∗∗ -0.232 1.324∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.052) (0.046) (0.048) (0.225) (0.273)
++Birth place (N=12,433)
Districts×Post Oil -0.201∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.089 0.269∗
(0.100) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038) (0.197) (0.162)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Controls Yes Similar controls for all quantiles
Note: Each model includes each of the specified variable in addition to the baseline model. Industry controls
specify where household head work and Birth place is a dummy indicating if the head is born in a district or
not. Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses for quantiles. Clustered standard errors
at the district level for OLS. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
4.5.4 Migration
The oil boom has a possibility of not only affecting residents in the treated district but
also in-migrants from across Ghana into the Western region. The identification threat
to our estimate is when most migrants into the treated district, post oil extraction,
are from the control group. This will contaminate our identification strategy. It is
worth mentioning that we observe a high level of migration into the Western region
prior to the oil extraction; about 40 percent but a reduction to 11 percent in the
2013 survey, with only 0.8 percent of households reporting to have migrated from
the Greater Accra region. This indicates a smaller proportion of migrants from the
larger control group (Ghana Statistical Service 2016).
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Nonetheless, the findings are not influenced by a post oil extraction migration as
we follow Guryan (2004) and examine a possible systematic effect of migration on
our estimates. We use an indicator for migration status as a dependent variable and
estimate a linear probability model with our difference-in-differences framework. As
presented in Table C.9 in the Appendix, we find positive selection of households into
our treated district but these are small in magnitude and not statistically different
from zero. These results show that migration does not play any role in influencing
the oil extraction effect on our outcome variables.
4.5.5 Alternative Treated and Control groups
Although a similarity of trends in both the treated and control districts before the
extraction of oil is a necessary condition for the validity of our identification strategy,
a growing Ghanaian economy would result in wrongly attributing the changes in
the outcome to the oil extraction, therefore invalidating our strategy. Moreover, the
choice of control group can influence the estimates above. We hereafter, estimate
the oil effect using different control groups. We use the Greater Accra region
as an independent control because it is considered as the most populous and has
expenditure levels higher than other parts of Ghana. We also use households in
districts in the Ashanti region given the commonalities in terms of occupation,
ethnicity and linguistics to the treated districts as noted in the GLSS reports. We
therefore re-estimate equation (4.7) with households in all districts of Greater Accra
as a control group and also for Ashanti region. Figure 4.9 shows similar trend across
quantiles qualitatively as the baseline estimates.
Considering treatment status is to households in districts at the coast of the
Western region, we use other coastal regions- Greater Accra and Volta- as control
group given a possible similarities in the pattern of expenditure. We re-estimate
our model and present the results in Table C.7 and graphically in Figure 4.9.
Qualitatively, we find similar results for the oil effect on expenditure as earlier but a
significant positive effect only at the 25th quantile.10
10We use all districts in the Western region as treated sample and re-estimate the model and find
the estimates to be similar to the baseline model. This is presented in Figure C.6 in the appendix.
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we examined oil extraction effect on the expenditure of households in
Ghana. Using data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey, we assign treatment
status to districts along the coast of Western region and use districts further
away as control group. Employing an unconditional quantile estimation within a
difference-in-differences framework, we find oil extraction effect on expenditure to be
positive and significant for households at lower tails of the distribution (below the
20th quantile). We also find negative oil extraction effects for households at higher
tail of the distribution. Additionally, we find that the oil extraction impact on food
share of expenditure is downward sloping but upward sloping for non-food share of
expenditure. This shows that with a given shock, rich households perceive food items
as inferior goods and non-food items as normal goods. With increasing price levels,
the general wellbeing of poor households in the treated districts deteriorated with only
the rich benefiting from the oil extraction. Our estimates show that examining the
oil effect at the quantiles is much informative and aids in answering some theoretical
questions pertaining to a shock on household expenditure.
The possibility of households increasing their expenditure as a result of the oil
extraction shock stems from the possibility of an increase in income. Figure C.7 in
the Appendix shows that income increased on average and also along the distribution
beyond the 10th quantile. However, the impact on income is noisy for poor households.
Additionally, the variation along the distribution is not significantly different from
the increase in average.
The mechanism through which we observe these impacts is the increased economic
activity in the treated districts. With oil extraction in the area, residents find it as
an opportunity to accrue wealth and engage in other beneficial activities. We test
this mechanism by estimating the impact of oil extraction on household likelihood of
having electricity and changes in their wealth status using the Demographic Health
Survey (DHS) for Ghana. We use the 4th,5th and 6th rounds of the survey conducted
in 2003, 2008 and 2014 respectively. Table 4.8 presents the difference-in-differences
estimate using the same treated and control districts as the baseline model. Electricity
145
is an indicator for whether households are connected to the national grid. Wealth
index is a rank variable from 1 (poorest) to 5 (richest), which measures households’
wealth. We redefine this index as Poor, Middle and Rich so as to observe the
heterogeneous effect for these sub-groups.
Table 4.8: Oil extraction impact using DHS Data
Wealth Index
Electricity Wealth index Poor Middle High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Districts × Post Oil 0.097∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.012 0.147∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.041) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Observations 8,177 8,177 8,177 8,177 8,177
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Electricity is an indicator for households connected to the national power grid. Wealth index is a
rank variable from 1 (poorest) to 5 (richest). Districts and PostOil are indicators for Treated districts
and post oil extraction period as defined in the baseline model. Controls include household size, type of
residence of household, education and gender of household head. Robust standard errors clustered at district
level in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
The new oil boom increased the likelihood of a household in the treated district
getting connected to the national grid (column (1)). Th extraction also increased the
wealth status of households, with a reduction in poor households to an increase of
rich ones (columns (2-5)). These estimates compliments the heterogeneous impacts
in the baseline model and show households were impacted positively as a result of
the oil extraction.
The narrative from the baseline estimate shows that the extraction of oil had
a positive impact on the wellbeing of richer households in districts closer to the
extraction area but also came with it challenges for poor households. The unusual
characteristics of the oil being light and sweet did not only result in an increase in
income but also pollution of the water bodies resulting in increased cost of production
for farmers, especially fish farmers.11 The increased cost of production resulted
in increase prices of mostly food items and lowered the welfare of residents in the
districts. The effect of pollution from natural resource extraction is well documented
11See Deutsche Welle (2017)
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in Aragón & Rud (2015) who using the GLSS data found farmers in gold mining
communities in Ghana to have lost almost 40% in total factor productivity. With the
recent discovery of further oil deposits in Ghana, it is required that certain policies be
put in place to ensure the wellbeing of residents are highly considered. The ability of
the government to ensure extracting firms follow the needed regulations to actually
reduce the amount of waste made and minimize the use of toxic inputs will help to
ensure the wellbeing of residents.
The policy implication of the negative natural resources impact is that the
increasing level of prices if not managed will consistently wipe away any significant
benefit that will be gained from the natural resources. The government should
put in place measures to maintain a stable currency such as regulating the level
of importation, which largely contribute to the decrease in the value of the local
currency.
Notwithstanding our findings, there is a limitation to our study. The data used
does not have information on household saving habit making it difficult to examine
how much of the share of income was saved. Knowledge of this information will give
a clearer understanding of household behaviour as a result of a shock.
147
Appendix C





















2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Production Consumption










2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
GDP Growth Oil rents(% of GDP)












2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Agriculture (% of GDP) Services, etc. (% of GDP)
Manufacturing (% of GDP) Industry (% of GDP)
(c) Sector Share of GDP
148




















































































0 .2 .4 .6
Log Food Expenditure
Treated Non-Treated









0 2 4 6 8 10
Log Food Expenditure
Treated Non-Treated
(b) Food Expenditure After Extraction
150











0 5 10 15
Log Non-food Expenditure
Treated (Before) Non-Treated (Before)
Treated (Before) Non-Treated (After)
151































































(c) Effects across non-food expenditure
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(c) Effects across non-food expenditure
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Table C.2: Proportion of Household
Male Female Total
Expenditure 8,956 3,658 12,614
Food Expenditure 8,956 3,658 12,614
Non Food Expenditure 7,472 3,169 10,641
Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Std dev Min Max
Pre-Oil extraction
Outcome variables
Log expenditure 14,633 6.6250 1.0686 1.0986 11.0045
Log food expenditure 14,633 0.0487 0.0488 0 0.625737
Log non-food expenditure 5,973 3.4725 1.0786 0 7.8776
Controls
Log agehead 14,633 3.7607 .3441 2.7081 4.5951
Log age sq.head 14,633 14.2611 2.5816 7.3334 21.1151
Log completed years of educationhead 8,975 0.7950 0.7512 0 2.7725
Log household size 14,633 1.2121 0.7248 0 3.3673
Marital statushead 14,633 0.62421 0.4843 0 1
Post-Oil extraction
Outcome variables
Log expenditure 33,460 8.7467 0.7664 4.7740 11.9178
Log food expenditure 33,460 7.7700 0.8421 0 10.4848
Log non-food expenditure 33,544 6.8645 1.3510 0 13.9006
Controls
Log agehead 33,460 3.7653 0.3486 2.7081 4.5951
Log age sq.head 33,460 14.2994 2.6211 7.3335 21.1151
Log completed years of educationhead 33,460 1.9942 0.4213 1.6094 2.7725
Log household size 33,460 1.2191 0.7217 0 3.3672
Marital statushead 33,460 0.6749 0.4684 0 1
Note: Expenditure values in the 1998 and 2006 surveys were divided by 10,000 in order
to make them comparable to the re-denominated currency in 2013. see Bank of Ghana
(2007). Marital status is a dummy of 1 if household head is married and zero if otherwise.
Table C.4: Conditional quantile estimate of oil extraction impact on outcome variables
Quantiles
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Expenditure
Districts X Post Oil -0.059 1.244∗∗∗ 1.381 1.367 1.393 1.494
(0.045) (0.096) (0.063) (0.054) (0.058) (0.088)
Observations 12433 12433 12433 12433 12433 12433
Real exp
Districts X Post Oil -0.117∗∗ -0.017∗∗ 0.003 0.057 0.096 0.225∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.087) (0.068) (0.061) (0.062) (0.086)
Observations 12433 12433 12433 12433 12433 12433
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Controls Yes Similar controls for all quantiles
Note: Conditional quantile estimates following Koenker & Bassett Jr (1978). Bootstrapped standard errors with
500 replications in parentheses ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.5: Using Districts in Greater Accra as Control
Quantiles
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Expenditure
Districts X Post Oil 0.019 0.980∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.244) (0.097) (0.039) (0.038) (0.043)
Observations 8,163 8,041 8,041 8,041 8,041 8,041
Real exp
Districts X Post Oil -0.211 -0.743∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗ -0.694∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.053) (0.044) (0.042) (0.196) (0.148)
Observations 8,163 8,163 8,163 8,163 8,163 8,163
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Controls Yes Similar controls for all quantiles
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table C.6: Using Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra as Treated and Control group
Quantiles
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Expenditure
Sekondi-Takoradi × Post Oil -0.296∗∗∗ 0.892 1.192∗∗∗ -1.457∗∗∗ -1.021∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.806) (0.164) (0.117) (0.085) (0.079)
Observations 3277 3277 3277 3277 3277 3277
Real exp
Sekondi-Takoradi × Post Oil -0.288∗∗∗ -2.821∗∗∗ -1.600∗∗∗ -0.819∗∗∗ 4.202∗∗∗ 2.214∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.153) (0.098) (0.077) (0.567) (0.203)
Observations 3277 3277 3277 3277 3277 3277
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Controls Yes Similar controls for all quantiles
Note: Sekondi-Takoradi district is the treated group with Accra as the control group. Bootstrapped standard errors
with 500 replications in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.7: Using Districts in Central, Greater Accra and Volta as control group
Quantiles
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Expenditure
Districts X Post Oil -0.013 -0.077 0.216∗∗ 0.024 -0.013 -0.198∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.265) (0.090) (0.037) (0.035) (0.042)
Observations 16,227 16,227 16,227 16,227 16,227 16,227
Real exp
Districts X Post Oil -0.136 -0.178∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.193 0.177∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.042) (0.039) (0.040) (0.169) (0.159)
Observations 16,227 16,227 16,227 16,227 16,227 16,227
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Controls Yes Similar controls for all quantiles
Note: Control group includes districts in Central, Greater Accra and Volta regions. Bootstrapped standard errors
with 500 replications in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table C.8: Using districts in Ashanti as control group
Quantiles
OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Expenditure
Districts X Post Oil 0.004 0.187 0.070 -0.076∗∗ 0.030 -0.119∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.250) (0.104) (0.038) (0.039) (0.044)
Observations 8,409 8,409 8,409 8,409 8,409 8,409
Real exp
Districts X Post Oil -0.085 -0.233∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.059 0.372∗∗
(0.060) (0.047) (0.044) (0.043) (0.162) (0.155)
Observations 8,409 8,409 8,409 8,409 8,409 8,409
Year fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes, for all quantiles
Controls Yes Similar controls for all quantiles
Note: Districts in Ashanti region are control group. Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.9: Accounting for Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Districts×Post Oil 0.0908 0.0402 0.0383 0.00402
(0.101) (0.0491) (0.0409) (0.0246)
Districts -0.0136 0.00249 -0.00568 -0.00142
(0.0622) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0244)
Post Oil -0.0738∗∗ -0.0540∗∗ -0.0662∗∗ 0.0437∗∗∗
(0.0344) (0.0239) (0.0251) (0.00961)
Control Baseline Add industry Add Place of Birth Add length of stay
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Districts fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12614 12614 12614 5908
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.502 0.529 0.046
Note: Column (1) includes the baseline controls. We add industry control in column (2), place of birth
and length of stay in districts in columns (3) and (4) rspectively. Clustered standard errors at the district
level in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Do oil extraction have socio-economic impact on developing economies? This thesis
aimed to establish this fact by using a recent oil extraction in Ghana. The thesis
comprises of three chapter each of which aims to answer the aforementioned question.
The first chapter examines the Single Spine Pay Policy, which was made possible
by the revenue received from the oil extraction. The policy aimed to reduce the
wage disparity in the public sector and increase productivity. The findings from
this study are that the policy reduced public-private wage differential but only at
low end of the distribution. These gains are largely for women and workers in the
education and health sectors. However, the beneficiaries of the gains rather reduced
their productivity, measured as hours supplied.
The second chapter investigates the spillover effects from oil extraction to non-oil
local labour markets. The study finds positive spillovers on income of residents and
migration to districts closer to the extraction site. However, there is a negative
spillover on employment. These spillover effects decrease with the distance an
individual is from the oil extraction area. The effects are also heterogeneous across
gender and sector of the residents. Men and agriculture workers had a high positive
income spillovers while migrants were mostly women and retail workers. Employment
were largely negative but positive in the manufacturing sector.
The third chapter examines the oil extraction effect on the well-being of
households. The study uses household expenditure as a proxy measure of well being
and find poor households to have a positive oil effect on their expenditure whereas
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rich households had a negative oil extraction effect. The heterogeneity in these effects
is also observed for household expenditure share on food and non-food items. Poor
household expenditure were largely on food items whereas rich households spent
largely on non-food items. The effects are only recognisable for rich households when
price is accounted for in the estimation.
These findings show that there is a heterogeneous effect of oil extraction in
developing economies and examining the effect at the micro level show socio-economic
impact on individuals and households.
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